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THE RIGHT TO APPEAL*
CASSANDRA BURKE ROBERTSON**
It is time for the Supreme Court to explicitly recognize a
constitutional right to appeal. Over the last century, both the
federal and state judicial systems have increasingly relied on
appellate remedies to protect essential rights. In spite of the
modern importance of such remedies, however, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly declined to recognize a due process right
to appeal in either civil or criminal cases. Instead, it has
repeated nineteenth-century dicta denying the right of appeal,
and it has declined petitions for certiorari in both civil and
criminal cases that seek to persuade the Court to reconsider
that position.
This Article argues that a right to appeal protects both private
litigants and the justice system as a whole. First, doctrinal
consistency necessitates the explicit recognition of a
constitutional right to appeal—a right that the Supreme
Court’s criminal and punitive damages doctrines have already
implicitly recognized. Second, the modern procedural system
has developed in a way that relies on appellate remedies as
part of fundamental due process. Traditional procedural
safeguards—such as the jury trial and the executive clemency
process—may once have sufficiently protected due process
rights. In the modern era, however, these procedures have
diminished at the same time that reliance on appeals has
grown. As a result, if appellate remedies are removed from the
procedural framework, the system as a whole cannot provide
adequate due process protection. Finally, recognizing
constitutional protection for appellate rights would also
express a normative policy choice, promoting the values of
institutional legitimacy, respect for individual dignity,
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predictability, and accuracy. Appellate procedure has earned a
place in our contemporary understanding of due process; it is
time to recognize its role as a fundamental element of fair
judicial practice.
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INTRODUCTION
The promise of appeal is built into American popular culture. It
is “the immemorial cry of every defeated litigant: ‘I’ll take it to the

CITE AS 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219

2013]

THE RIGHT TO APPEAL

Supreme Court!’ ”1 Both the criminal defendant who is wrongly
convicted and the civil defendant facing a potentially bankrupting
judgment hold on dearly to the promise of error correction in a higher
court. Their lawyers may quickly instruct them that Supreme Court
review is both discretionary and difficult to obtain, trying to refocus
their hopes on a state or federal court of appeals.2 What even the
lawyers may not know, however, is that appellate review is not
constitutionally guaranteed; in some jurisdictions, the losing litigant
may be forced to go without any review of the trial court’s verdict at
all. This was the case for Massey Energy Company, which faced a
quarter-billion-dollar verdict (the seventh-largest verdict nationwide
in 2007) that was reviewed only by a single trial judge in West
Virginia.3 It was also the case for Frank Billotti, who was found guilty
of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the
possibility of parole—and without the right of direct appeal.4
This Article argues that the Supreme Court should explicitly
recognize a constitutional right to appeal. Over the last century, both
the federal and state judicial systems have increasingly relied on
appellate remedies to protect individual rights, including the
fundamental rights of life and liberty.5 In spite of the modern
importance of such remedies, however, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly declined to recognize a due process right to appeal in
either civil or criminal cases. Instead, it has repeated nineteenthcentury dicta denying the right of appeal,6 and it has declined
1. James J. Kilpatrick, Supreme Court Load Grows Heavier, EVENING INDEP. (St.
Petersburg, Fla.), Dec. 30, 1972, at 14-A.
2. See The Honorable Samuel A. Alito, Jr. et al., The Inaugural William French
Smith Memorial Lecture: A Look at Supreme Court Advocacy with Justice Samuel Alito,
35 PEPP. L. REV. 465, 477 (2008) (“Well, one thing that you cannot control is a client that
is absolutely convinced that the decision below is wrong, and therefore they want to take it
to the Supreme Court. You hear that expression, ‘We’ll take it all the way to the Supreme
Court.’ Sometimes I can say to them, ‘I mean, literally, you have zero chance of having
the Court grant certiorari in this case.’ ”).
3. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2, Cent. W. Va. Energy Co. v. Wheeling
Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 555 U.S. 1045 (2008) (No. 08-218), 2008 WL 3884291, at *2.
4. Billotti v. Legursky, 975 F.2d 113, 114 (4th Cir. 1992). Billotti filed a habeas
petition in federal court; the federal court found that West Virginia’s discretionary review
procedures “comport[ed] with the requirements of due process,” and dismissed the case.
Id.
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 31 & n.4 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (stating that the Supreme Court’s “precedents . . . tend to support” the idea
that “[s]tates are under no constitutional duty to provide for civil appeals”); Cobbledick v.
United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324–25 (1940) (“[T]he right to a judgment from more than
one court is a matter of grace and not a necessary ingredient of justice . . . .”); McKane v.
Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687–88 (1894) (“A review by an appellate court of the final
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petitions for certiorari in both civil and criminal cases seeking to
persuade the Court to reconsider that position.7
The Supreme Court has been able to avoid ruling on the matter
precisely because appellate remedies are nearly universal: the federal
court system and forty-seven states provide—as a matter of state
law—either a constitutional or statutory requirement for appeals as of
right in both civil and criminal cases.8 Nevertheless, this high degree
of state-level protection does not obviate the need for a constitutional
remedy. Without the protection of an effective system of appellate
review, there will continue to be parties who face significant
deprivations of liberty or property without any guarantee of review by
a higher court. Even if these cases are few in number, they are
nonetheless important; the due process doctrine is, after all, meant to
protect the unusual or rare case in which justice has been denied. As
judgment in a criminal case, however grave the offence of which the accused is convicted,
. . . is not now a necessary element of due process of law.”).
7. See, e.g., Superior Highwall Miners, Inc. v. Frye, 130 S. Ct. 2354 (2010); Cent.
W. Va. Energy Co., 555 U.S. 1045; NiSource, Inc. v. Estate of Tawney, 555 U.S. 1041
(2008); Camden-Clark Mem’l Hosp. Corp. v. Boggs, 553 U.S. 1017 (2008); Mountain
Enters., Inc. v. Fitch, 541 U.S. 989 (2004). On the criminal side, the Court denied
certiorari petitions in Ratliff v. Virginia, 516 U.S. 815 (1995), and in Billotti, 507 U.S. 984.
8. See Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39
UCLA L. REV. 503, 513–14 (1992). There are three states—New Hampshire, West
Virginia, and Virginia—without a state constitutional or statutory provision for appeal as
of right for criminal defendants. See Bundy v. Wilson, 815 F.2d 125, 128 (1st Cir. 1987).
Two of these states (New Hampshire and West Virginia) have, within the last decade,
adopted a court rule providing review of all appeals in the state supreme court. See N.H.
SUP. CT. R. 3, available at http://www.courts.state.nh.us/rules/scr/scr-3.htm (“A
mandatory appeal shall be accepted by the supreme court for review on the merits. A
mandatory appeal is . . . an appeal from a final decision on the merits issued by a superior
court . . . .”); W. VA. R. APP. P. 21 (clerk’s cmt.), available at
http://www.courtswv.gov/legal-community/court-rules/appellate-procedure/pdfs/RevisedRules-of-Appellate-Procedure-FINAL.pdf. The New Hampshire rule, however, does note
certain exceptions that do not constitute mandatory appeals such as “an appeal from a final
decision on the merits issued in a sentence modification or suspension proceeding. N.H.
SUP. CT. R. 3. Virginia does have an intermediate appellate court, but the court has
discretionary review power over non-capital criminal cases, and provides appeals as of
right only in limited categories of civil cases. General civil cases, by contrast, do not go to
the intermediate court and are instead subject to discretionary review in the Virginia
Supreme Court. See VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-4056(A) (2010); see also Bevel v.
Commonwealth, 717 S.E.2d 789, 790 n.11 (Va. 2011) (“In criminal cases in Virginia,
other than in cases where a sentence of death is imposed, the awarding of an appeal is
discretionary and not a matter of right.”); L. Steven Emmert, Certiorari v. Error
Correction: Which Is Which, and Why It Matters, VA. APP. NEWS & ANALYSIS (Feb. 3,
2010), http://www.virginia-appeals.com/essay.aspx?id=155 (explaining that the Supreme
Court of Virginia has discretionary review in most cases and noting that “you have to
petition for a writ in criminal and traffic cases”). However, a “refusal” by the Supreme
Court of Virginia is considered to be a decision on the merits. See Sheets v. Castle, 559
S.E.2d 616, 619 (Va. 2002).
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the Supreme Court has stated, “[E]xtreme cases are more likely to
cross constitutional limits, requiring this Court’s intervention and
formulation of objective standards. This is particularly true when due
process is violated.”9 By recognizing a nondiscretionary constitutional
right to appeal, the Court can ensure that liberty and property rights
remain protected even in the unusual or uninviting case.
Recognizing constitutional protection for appellate rights also
prevents states from eliminating current statutory protections in an era
of shrinking state budgets. Even before the current fiscal crisis, some
scholars had advocated that states eliminate appeals as of right in
order to save fiscal and administrative resources.10 That threat moved
closer to becoming a reality in 2012, when a Virginia state lawmaker
proposed eliminating the state’s intermediate appellate court in order
to save eight million dollars a year.11 But when weighed against the
risks of erroneous and uncorrectable rulings, the disruption of other
procedures that depend on robust appellate rights, and diminished
faith in the judicial system, the costs of guaranteed review are costs
worth shouldering.
This Article argues that a right to appeal protects both private
litigants and the justice system as a whole.12 Part I examines the role
9. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 887 (2009). But see
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 373 (1993) (“For better or for worse,
the [due process] doctrine reflects an implicit premise that individual fairness must often
be sacrificed to the practical needs of the modern administrative state.”).
10. See Bernard G. Barrow, The Discretionary Appeal: A Cost Effective Tool of
Appellate Justice, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 31, 31 (1988); Donald P. Lay, A Proposal for
Discretionary Review in Federal Courts of Appeal, 34 SW. L.J. 1151, 1156–57 (1981);
Robert M. Parker & Ron Chapman, Jr., Accepting Reality: The Time for Adopting
Discretionary Review in the Courts of Appeals Has Arrived, 50 SMU L. Rev. 573, 582
(1997) (“Discretionary review would save time, money, and effort and would more
honestly describe the system currently in place, a system in which courts exercise
discretion behind a facade of deliberation.”).
11. Deeds: Kill the Court of Appeals, VLW BLOG (Jan. 3, 2012),
http://valawyersweekly.com/vlwblog/2012/01/23/deeds-kill-the-court-of-appeals/ (noting
that Senator Creigh Deeds introduced a bill to abolish the Virginia Court of Appeals).
12. This Article is the first to present a sustained argument in favor of an overarching
right to appeal in civil and criminal cases. One scholar has proposed such a right in a short
piece. See Henry G. Fins, Is the Right of Appeal Protected by the Fourteenth Amendment?,
54 JUDICATURE 296, 297 (1971). Other scholars have argued explicitly for a right to
appeal in criminal cases or in limited subsets of civil cases. See, e.g., Arkin, supra note 8,
at 513, 520 (arguing for right in criminal cases); Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to
Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 69 (1985) (arguing for a right in
limited categories of civil cases); James E. Lobsenz, A Constitutional Right to an Appeal:
Guarding Against Unacceptable Risks of Erroneous Conviction, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 375, 375 (1985) (arguing for right of appeal in criminal cases); Alex S. Ellerson,
Note, The Right to Appeal and Appellate Procedural Reform, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 373,
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of appellate remedies in the American justice system, analyzes
appellate outcomes and reversal rates, and explores the convergence
of civil and criminal appellate remedies. Parts II and III make
doctrinal arguments for the recognition of a constitutional right: Part
II focuses on the private interests of individual litigants, applying the
Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to weigh those private interests
against the cost of appellate review, and Part III argues that doctrinal
consistency necessitates the explicit recognition of a constitutional
right to appeal, as the Court’s criminal and punitive damages
doctrines have already implicitly recognized such a right. Part IV
moves away from doctrine to examine the larger structure of the
modern procedural system. It argues that even though Congress and
the states may have voluntarily exceeded the requirements of
constitutional due process when they first adopted broad appellate
rights, the procedural system that has grown up around those rights
relies on appellate remedies so broadly that they are now part of
fundamental due process. Traditional procedural safeguards—such as
the jury trial and the executive clemency process—may once have
sufficiently protected due process rights. In the modern era, however,
these procedures have diminished at the same time that reliance on
appeals has grown; if appellate remedies are removed from the
procedural framework, the system as a whole cannot provide
adequate due process protection. Finally, Part V examines the
expressive value of constitutionalizing appellate rights. It weighs the
normative values inherent in constitutional recognition of a
nondiscretionary right to appeal, and it analyzes the values that would
be favored—as well as those that would be disfavored—by extending
a nondiscretionary right of appeal.
I. THE ROLE OF APPELLATE REMEDIES IN THE AMERICAN JUSTICE
SYSTEM
Appellate remedies play a significant role in the American
justice system.13 Legal scholars have identified a number of different
382 (1991) (arguing for a right in criminal cases). Two prominent scholars have also filed
an amicus brief arguing for a right to appeal in civil cases. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law
Professors in Support of Petitioner at 1, Cent. W. Va. Energy Co., 555 U.S. 1045 (No. 08218), 2008 WL 4360892, at *1. Another has suggested that the Supreme Court should
recognize a right to civil appeals in the context of a broader discussion of constitutional
procedure. See John Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEX. L. REV. 579, 580
(1984).
13. This Article uses the term “appeal” in its broad modern sense “to designate any
attempt to have a higher court review the factual or legal findings of a lower tribunal.”
Joan Steinman, Appellate Courts as First Responders: The Constitutionality and Propriety
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functions that a robust appellate system serves, including correcting
legal and factual errors;14 encouraging the development and
refinement of legal principles;15 increasing uniformity and
standardization in the application of legal rules;16 and promoting
respect for the rule of law.17 In criminal cases, appellate rights play an
additional role in guarding against wrongful conviction of the
innocent.18
This Part examines the role of appellate remedies in the
American justice system. It begins by analyzing appellate outcomes,
including the rate of appeals, the rate of reversals, and the winners
and losers of the appellate process. It continues by examining the
intertwining of process and policy on appeal; specifically, it argues
that although some people have advocated for differential treatment
of civil and criminal appeals as a policy matter, the two spheres
present the same process values. Treating the two spheres together
allows a deeper focus on the procedural and systemic benefits of the
appellate process that go beyond the question of who wins and who
loses in a particular case.

of Appellate Courts’ Resolving Issues in the First Instance, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1521, 1546 (2012) (citation omitted).
14. See Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49, 49 (2010) (“Most
depictions of appellate courts suggest that they serve two core functions: the creation and
refinement of law and the correction of error.”).
15. See PAUL D. CARRINGTON, DANIEL J. MEADOR, & MAURICE ROSENBERG,
JUSTICE ON APPEAL 3 (1976) (“[A]ppellate courts are needed to announce, clarify, and
harmonize the rules of decision employed by the legal system in which they serve.”);
Oldfather, supra note 14, at 49 (noting that a function of appellate courts is “the creation
and refinement of law”); see also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Deciding When to Decide:
How Appellate Procedure Distributes the Costs of Legal Change, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
203, 214 (2011) (examining the “institutional dimension” of how courts handle changing
legal doctrine through the appellate process).
16. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Appellate Review of Discovery Orders in
Federal Court: A Suggested Approach for Handling Privilege Claims, 81 WASH. L. REV.
733, 771 (2006); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens on Appeal: The
Case for Interlocutory Review, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 445, 455 (2012) (“The classic remedy
for inconsistent application of the law is appellate review.”).
17. See Michael Heise, Federal Criminal Appeals: A Brief Empirical Perspective, 93
MARQ. L. REV. 825, 827 (2009) (“Despite their comparative scarcity, appealed cases—far
more than cases that settle or go to trial—form the basis of much of what many observers
know about the legal system.”).
18. See Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 MARQ.
L. REV. 591, 591–92 (2009) (noting the role of criminal appellate courts in protecting
against wrongful conviction).
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Appellate Outcomes

Appellate remedies are able to play a significant jurisprudential
role precisely because of the near-universality of appellate rights. In
federal court and in nearly every state, litigants who lose in the trial
court are guaranteed one appeal as of right.19 In civil cases, not every
losing party will avail itself of an appeal; researchers examining
appellate outcomes have estimated that only approximately fifteen
percent of state-court civil cases are appealed.20 Plaintiffs and
defendants appealed trial-court judgments at a nearly equal rate.21 In
criminal cases, defendants who plead guilty—especially to smaller
crimes—are unlikely to appeal.22 However, almost every criminal
defendant who loses at trial will have an incentive to file an appeal.23
On appeal, civil defendants tend to do better than plaintiffs.24
Overall, when ruling on the merits, state appellate courts affirmed the
trial court verdict in about two-thirds of all cases and reversed or
modified the judgment in nearly one-third of the cases.25 When
broken down by type of appellant, however, success rates diverge
significantly; forty-two percent of trial court decisions favoring
plaintiffs were reversed or modified, as compared to only twenty-one
19. See Arkin, supra note 8, at 513–14.
20. See THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, NCJ 212979, APPEALS FROM GENERAL CIVIL TRIALS IN 46 LARGE COUNTIES,
2001–2005, at 2 (2006).
21. See id. at 3 (noting that forty-eight percent of appeals were filed by plaintiffs and
fifty-two percent by defendants).
22. See Heise, supra note 17, at 832 (“[P]lea bargains are rarely reviewed for error.”);
Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 320 (2011) (“[O]nly a small percentage of
individuals convicted of a misdemeanor file an appeal or seek other post-conviction
review of counsel’s effectiveness.”); see also JOHN SCALIA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 185055, FEDERAL CRIMINAL APPEALS, 1999
WITH
TRENDS
1985–1999,
at
1,
3
(2001),
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fca99.pdf (noting that defendants appealed sixteen
out of every 100 federal court convictions overall, but only five per 100 in misdemeanor
cases).
23. See, e.g., Heise, supra note 17, at 829 (“Because pursuing a criminal appeal is
essentially free—or more accurately, because criminal appellants are not forced to
internalize the full costs of their appeal—there is little incentive not to appeal.”); J. Clark
Kelso, A Report on the California Appellate System, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 445 n.43
(1994) (“In 1991-92, there were 152 appeals from every 100 convictions after contested
trials. A significant number of appeals follow guilty pleas, which explains how 152
appeals follow 100 convictions after contested trials.” (citations omitted)).
24. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial:
Defendants’ Advantage, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 125, 125 (2001) (“Defendants appealing
their losses after trial by jury obtain reversals at a 31% rate, while losing plaintiffs succeed
in only 13% of their appeals from jury trials.”).
25. See COHEN, supra note 20, at 1.
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percent of decisions favoring defendants.26 Large verdicts were
especially likely to be overturned; “nearly half (48%) of appeals from
trials with damage awards of over $1 million were reversed or
modified by the appellate courts,” while only thirty-five percent of
cases with a damage award between $1 and $100,000 were
overturned on appeal.27 In federal court, verdicts favorable to
plaintiffs were reversed in one-third of appeals, and verdicts favorable
to defendants were reversed in only twelve percent of cases.28
Appeals from criminal convictions arise in a very different
landscape than civil appeals. First, the prevalence of plea bargaining
filters those cases which go through the trial process.29 Second,
generally only the convicted defendant has a possible appellate
remedy, as double jeopardy protections prevent the government from
appealing an acquittal.30 Those defendants who are convicted at trial
have incentive to appeal, and indigent defendants are provided
publicly appointed counsel.31 Thus, the cases eligible for appeal may
differ from the larger universe of criminal cases in two different—and
potentially opposing—respects. At the pretrial stage, the defendant
who chooses to go to trial rather than accept a plea bargain is likely to
have a relatively stronger case. After trial, however, a losing
defendant has a strong incentive to appeal even a case that has proven
quite weak.32
Most criminal convictions are affirmed on appeal. In federal
court, the affirmance rate is approximately seventy percent, though
there are significant differences among federal circuits.33 In state
26. See id. at 5.
27. Id. at 6.
28. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate
Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV.
947, 947.
29. See Heise, supra note 17, at 827 (“Selection effects and case stream filtering
work in a manner that most often reduces the number of criminal appeals likely to be
reversed.”); see also Editorial, Trial Judge to Appeals Court: Review Me, N.Y. TIMES,
July 17, 2012, at A24 (“[A] vast majority of criminal cases—97 percent of federal cases,
94 percent of state cases—are resolved by guilty pleas.”).
30. See Heise, supra note 17, at 830–31 (“In the civil context, either party has the
ability to appeal. In the criminal context, however, constitutional double jeopardy
protections for criminal defendants generally afford defendants only with the opportunity
to appeal an adverse trial judgment.”).
31. See id. at 829.
32. See id. (“Because pursuing a criminal appeal is essentially free—or, more
accurately, because criminal appellants are not forced to internalize the full costs of their
appeal—there is little incentive not to appeal.”).
33. See id. at 833 (“Although the overall average nationwide affirmance rate for 2006
criminal appeals was 68.5%, across the nation’s twelve federal circuits affirmance rates
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court, the affirmance rate varies between seventy and eighty percent.34
When appellate courts reverse a conviction, they are much more
likely to order a retrial than to acquit the defendant entirely.35 Outlier
sentences—both the shortest and the longest—are more likely to be
reversed on appeal than mid-range sentences, though defendants
facing longer sentences are less likely to win complete acquittal on
appeal than those facing shorter ones.36
B.

The False Dichotomy Between Civil and Criminal Appeals

Arguments in favor of extending constitutional protection to
appellate remedies have typically focused either on criminal or civil
appeals, rather than supporting a generalized appellate remedy.37 But
while some policy reasons may apply in one sphere and not the other,
the process values supporting broad appellate remedies are more alike
than different.
Those who argue in favor of extending constitutional protections
only to civil appeals point out the extensive safeguards already
present in criminal cases.38 For example, criminal prosecutions must
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; the indigent criminal defendant
is entitled to appointed counsel; and criminal juries may acquit
without being subject to review.39 In many states, juries can convict
ranged from a low of 49.3% (D.C. Circuit) to a high of 85.1% (Eleventh Circuit). Reversal
rates ranged from 5.7% to 20.5%.”).
34. See id. at 830; see also JOY A. CHAPPER & ROGER A. HANSON, NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, UNDERSTANDING REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CRIMINAL APPEALS 5 (1989)
(“[T]he overall affirmance rate for [appellate courts in five states] is 79.4%. Four of the
courts (all but Rhode Island) are within plus-or-minus two percentage points of that figure
(78.6, 79.3, 79.3, and 81.7%); Rhode Island’s affirmance rate was 70.8%.”).
35. CHAPPER & HANSON, supra note 34, at 5 (“Acquittals constituted only 1.9% of
all appeals and only 9.4% of all nonaffirmances or ‘winners.’ In no jurisdiction did
acquittals occur in as many as 4% of all appeals. A remand with the possibility of retrial
was more likely—6.6% of all appeals and 31.9% of all winners.”).
36. See id. at 6 (“ ‘Winning big’ (i.e., an acquittal or a new trial) occurs most
frequently in appeals with the least serious sentence; appeals involving the longest
sentences show the highest percentage of ‘winning little’ (i.e., resentencing or other
modification).”).
37. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, supra
note 12, at 1, 2008 WL 4360892, at *1 (focusing on civil appeals); Arkin, supra note 8, at
513 (focusing on criminal appeals).
38. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, supra note 12,
at 6–7, 2008 WL 4360892, at *6–7.
39. See id. at 5–7, 2008 WL 4360892, at *5–7; see also Lavett v. People, 7 Cow. 339,
343 (N.Y. 1827) (“Criminal proceedings have thrown around the innocent so many guards
that the writ of error is almost useless.”); Bedinger v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. (1 Call) 461,
469 (1803) (stating that some safeguards of defendants in criminal cases include the
“power of the jury to acquit in a criminal case, the pardoning power of the executive, and
the objection to great delays in the execution of the criminal law”).
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only though unanimous agreement, and the executive branch
generally possesses the power to grant clemency.40 As a result, some
have concluded that criminal outcomes are protected by sufficient
procedural safeguards, and that “guaranteed access to postjudgment
review” is therefore needed only in civil cases.41 This view is also
grounded in long-standing practices, as the federal system and some
states historically offered greater appellate remedies in the civil
sphere than in the criminal sphere.42 This divergence continues today
in Virginia, where parties can appeal as of right in civil cases
involving domestic relations, workers’ compensation, and
administrative law cases—but have only a discretionary appeal in
noncapital criminal cases.43
In spite of the historically greater protection for civil appeals,
some have argued that it is more important to extend appellate
protection to criminal cases than civil ones.44 Criminal appeals protect
against the erroneous deprivation of liberty and, in capital cases,
against the erroneous deprivation of life.45 As one scholar has pointed
out, it is “generally accepted as a part of American social philosophy
that the right to liberty is as great as, if not greater than, the right of
property.”46 As a result, some scholars have argued that it violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection to allow civil appeals as
of right without extending the same protection to criminal appeals.47
40. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, supra note 12,
at 5–6, 2008 WL 4360892, at *5–6.
41. Id. at 7, 2008 WL 4360892, at *7.
42. See, e.g., Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 508 (1903) (“Neither is the right of
appeal essential to due process of law. In nearly every State are statutes giving, in criminal
cases of a minor nature, a single trial, without any right of review . . . . In civil cases a
common rule is that the amount in controversy limits the entire litigation to one court, yet
there was never any serious question that in these cases due process of law was granted.”);
Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272, 272 (1895) (noting that, at the time the case was
decided, New Jersey law allowed appeals as of right in non-capital cases but allowed only
a discretionary “writ of grace” in capital cases).
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-405 (2010); see also Bevel v. Commonwealth, 717 S.E.2d
789, 790 n.1 (Va. 2011) (“In criminal cases in Virginia, other than in cases where a
sentence of death is imposed, the awarding of an appeal is discretionary and not a matter
of right.”); Robert P. Davidow & Damon W.D. Wright, Virginia’s Discriminatory
Treatment of Criminal Appeals: Some Constitutional and Policy Considerations, 6 GEO.
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1, 5–6 (1996).
44. See Arkin, supra note 8, at 521–24; Lobsenz, supra note 12, at 389.
45. See Lobsenz, supra note 12, at 383 (arguing that the “risk of convicting the
innocent” justifies constitutional protection of criminal appeals).
46. Fins, supra note 12, at 297.
47. Davidow & Wright, supra note 43, at 33–34 (arguing that Virginia’s appellate
statutes “placed civil litigants in a ‘preferred appellate position’ ” in relation to that of
criminal defendants).
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Others have argued that the complexity of constitutional criminal
procedure makes appellate remedies particularly important within the
criminal justice system.48
But while most commentators have argued for expanded
protection of either civil or criminal appeals, the justifications that
they cite are largely the same in both spheres. Both civil and criminal
appeals protect against arbitrary or erroneous application of the law;
both promote the development and standardization of legal doctrine;
and both assist in standardizing outcomes for similarly situated
litigants.49 The risks of withholding appellate remedies are also more
similar than different. On the criminal side, scholars have pointed out
that because of the high error rate at trial, appeals are critical to
maintaining institutional legitimacy: “The degree of error reported, if
left uncorrected because of the elimination of a right of appeal that is
merely statutory, would be intolerably high and would delegitimate
any punishment imposed through such an adjudicatory process.”50
Others have made a similar legitimacy argument in support of civil
appeals:
As the framers of the Constitution recognized, the absence of a
guaranteed appeal in cases involving substantial deprivations of
property would undermine confidence in the judicial system;
“were there no appeal [guaranteed for civil judgments], every
man would have reason to complain, especially when a final
judgment, in an inferior court, should affect property to a large
amount.”51
Given the similar roles played by civil and criminal appeals, it is
surprising that some would recommend treating them differently. This
inconsistent treatment makes more sense, however, when viewed in
terms of policy rather than doctrine. In the criminal justice system,
48. See Arkin, supra note 8, at 574–76.
49. See Barbara B. Crabb, In Defense of Direct Appeals: A Further Reply to
Professor Chemerinsky, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 137, 138 (1997) (“Americans continue to
believe in the right of appeal, both as a means of giving a second chance to be heard, albeit
in limited fashion, thus providing a greater sense of fair treatment, and for its normative
function, in essence reining in the outliers among the lower courts, with the result that
litigants can expect reasonably uniform and consistent treatment within the courts of any
particular jurisdiction.”).
50. Rosanna Cavallaro, Better Off Dead: Abatement, Innocence, and the Evolving
Right of Appeal, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 943, 980 (2002).
51. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, supra note 12, at
7–8, 2008 WL 4360892, at *7–8 (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, EXAMINATION INTO THE
LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1787), reprinted in PAMPHLETS
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY
THE PEOPLE, 1787–1788, at 53 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1968) (1888)).
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robust appellate remedies aid criminal defendants—a group with very
little political support.52 Those who do support expanded protections
for criminal defendants tend to fall nearer to the left side of the
political spectrum.53 In civil cases, however, support for a robust
system of appellate review skews toward the right: because large civil
verdicts are more likely to be reversed on appeal, corporate
defendants and tort reform groups are more likely to support civil
appellate rights.54 The effect of judicial elections may further solidify
these positions, as the public is likely to choose judges whose views
conform to those of the electorate.55
Thus, when people advocate for expanded appellate process,
they may advocate for that expanded process only in a limited number
of cases: only in death penalty cases, or only in felony cases, or only
in civil cases, or only in civil cases where punitive damages have
been awarded. Such a strategy may backfire, however, if it limits the
52. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Note, The Supreme Court’s Backwards
Proportionality Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive Criminal
Punishments and Excessive Punitive Damages Awards, 86 VA. L. REV. 1249, 1300 (2000)
(“[L]egislatures often do not consider the interests of criminal defendants. In a ‘tough on
crime’ political world, politicians do not win elections unless they announce that they will
punish criminals severely.”); see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 127 (1975)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“[T]he Constitution extends less procedural protection to an
imprisoned human being than is required to test the propriety of garnishing a commercial
bank account, the custody of a refrigerator, the temporary suspension of a public school
student, or the suspension of a driver’s license.” (citations omitted)).
53. See, e.g., Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 34 (2001) (“In
criminal cases, Democratic judges generally are more sympathetic to criminal defendants,
while Republicans tend to favor prosecution and law enforcement.”); William H.
Rehnquist, Who Writes Decisions of the Supreme Court?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Dec.
13,
1957,
at
74,
75,
available
at
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2008/12/09/william-rehnquist-writes-in-1957-onsupreme-court-law-clerks-influence (characterizing Supreme Court clerks as taking
“left[ist]” positions that showed “extreme solicitude for the claims of Communists and
other criminal defendants”).
54. Cf. Richie Heath, Their View: Personal Attacks Aimed at Protecting Profits, Not
Justice, W. VA. REC. (May 18, 2011, 1:00 PM), http://wvrecord.com/arguments/235596their-view-personal-attacks-aimed-at-protecting-profits-not-justice (arguing that the West
Virginia Association for Justice’s primary motive for objecting to the creation of a state
intermediate court of appeals and to the guarantee of appeals as of right in civil cases is
that its members—personal injury lawyers—benefit from the state’s restrictive appeals
process, using it to extort lucrative settlements from businesses, and noting that employers
are leaving the state to escape the inhospitable legal environment).
55. Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38 J.
LEGAL STUD. 169, 171 (2009) (“Judges facing Republican retention agents [i.e., a
Republican electorate] tend to vote in accord with standard Republican policy: they are
more likely to vote for businesses over individuals, for employers in labor disputes, for
doctors and hospitals in medical malpractice disputes, for businesses in products liability
cases, for original defendants in torts cases, and against criminals in criminal appeals. The
mirror image applies for judges facing retention decisions by Democrats.”).
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political constituency that could support the expansion of appellate
rights and reduces the possibility of coalition building; members of
the electorate who support greater appellate rights in cases involving
punitive damages, for example, may be different from those who
support greater appellate rights for criminal defendants.
This effect may explain the difficulty faced in West Virginia,
where tort reform groups have supported, and plaintiffs’ attorneys
have opposed, a guaranteed right to appeal.56 Because the measure
was presented as an outlet to review high punitive damage awards, it
gained traction only with those who supported damage limitations as
a policy matter.57 Although the West Virginia Supreme Court adopted
new rules for 2011 that require disposition on the merits, a proposal to
create an intermediate court of appeals stalled in the state
legislature.58
If different policy preferences account for people’s varying
views about the importance of civil and criminal appeals, then
considering the civil and criminal spheres together may overcome a
narrow political emphasis.59 At the individual level, such unification

56. See Heath, supra note 54.
57. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, supra
note 12, at 7–8, 2008 WL 4360892, at *7–8 (limiting the argument to civil cases); Heath,
supra note 54 (noting the difference in political support).
58. See Andrea Lannom, Appeals Declining but Some Still Want Intermediate Court,
ST. J. (W. Va.), Feb. 10, 2012, at 23 (quoting supporters of the creation of an intermediate
court as stating that such a court would “increase review of circuit court decisions and to
aid in the development of West Virginia law,” and quoting opponents of the measure who
state that it would merely “create a new layer of judges that the richest companies in West
Virginia can appoint themselves”).
59. When advocating that civil and criminal appeals be considered together, this
Article refers only to direct appeals, as these provide the closest analogy between the civil
and criminal spheres. On the criminal side, however, there are other types of post-trial
judicial review that are beyond the scope of this Article, most notably habeas corpus
review. See Christopher M. Johnson, Post-Trial Judicial Review of Criminal Convictions:
A Comparative Study of the United States and Finland, 64 ME. L. REV. 425, 428 (2012)
(noting that the American judicial system divides “ ‘post-trial judicial review’ into three
phases for state prisoners (direct appeal, state post-conviction review or collateral attack,
and federal habeas corpus), and two phases for federal prisoners (direct appeal and habeas
corpus)”). As others have noted, the relief offered through collateral review in a habeas
proceeding does not substitute for direct appellate review. See, e.g., Russell M. Coombs, A
Third Parallel Primrose Path: The Supreme Court’s Repeated, Unexplained, and Still
Growing Regulation of State Courts’ Criminal Appeals, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 541, 626
(“[C]onstitutional doctrine applicable to a case is more likely to favor the defendant in a
state appellate court than in a federal habeas court. . . . [The Supreme Court] requires that
defendants challenging their convictions or sentences on direct appeal in state courts
receive the benefit of new rules of federal constitutional law that favor them. In contrast,
the Supreme Court has held that, perhaps with narrow exceptions, state prisoners seeking
habeas relief in federal courts do not receive that benefit.”).
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allows for consistency between the two spheres in cases where the
remedies overlap; punitive damages can serve a punishment purpose
in civil litigation, and monetary restitution may be ordered in a
criminal case. In such cases, “comparable deprivations should
generally require a comparable degree of process. . . . The mere label
of ‘criminal’ or ‘civil’ should not be determinative of due process
rights that attach when the individual is threatened with virtually the
same harm in either instance.”60
Even when civil and criminal remedies play different roles,
taking a unified approach to civil and criminal appeals allows the
discussion to focus on the systemic effects of changed processes
rather than the policy effects of changed outcomes.61 Such systemic
changes will have real policy outcomes, but these policy outcomes are
not limited to the immediate effect of who wins and who loses in a
particular case. Instead, policy outcomes extend to the population at
large: those who observe the justice system, those who participate in
it, and those who consider participating in it—for example, by
choosing between litigation and arbitration, by including forum
selection clauses in contracts, and even by choosing where to locate a
business.62
II. DUE PROCESS PROTECTION FOR APPELLATE REMEDIES
The Supreme Court has repeatedly disclaimed the existence of
constitutional protection for either criminal or civil appeals.63 Because
60. Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 1, 57–58 (2006).
61. See Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94
VA. L. REV. 79, 86 (2008) (“[T]o the extent that detaching the two spheres is justified in
substance, a parallel split in procedure is not necessarily entailed. . . . [D]issociating
substantive civil and criminal law from procedure would better serve the goals of both.”).
62. See, e.g., Justin Anderson, Bill Lays Out Intermediate Appellate Courts, W. VA.
REC. (April 2, 2009, 11:30 AM), http://www.wvrecord.com/news/218275-bill-lays-outintermediate-appellate-courts (noting that Chesapeake Energy removed hundreds of jobs
from West Virginia after the state supreme court denied appellate review of a $400 million
verdict against it).
63. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 131 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging the Court’s “oft-affirmed view that due process does not oblige States to
provide for any appeal, even from a criminal conviction”); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,
481 U.S. 1, 31 n.4 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring) (disclaiming constitutional protection
for civil appeals); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (“It is true that a State is not
required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate
review at all.”); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940) (“[T]he right to a
judgment from more than one court is a matter of grace and not a necessary ingredient of
justice . . . .”); Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 508 (1903) (“Neither is the right of
appeal essential to due process of law. In nearly every state are statutes giving, in criminal
cases of a minor nature, a single trial, without any right of review. . . . In civil cases a
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most jurisdictions granted a statutory right of appeal, however, these
statements were almost always dicta; the Court has only rarely been
faced with cases in which all appellate review was denied. On the
criminal side, the issue has been raised in at least two certiorari
petitions in recent decades;64 however, the last time that the Supreme
Court accepted such a case was in 1895, in Andrews v. Swartz.65 At
that time, New Jersey law allowed an appeal as of right in non-capital
cases but allowed only a discretionary “writ of grace” in capital
cases.66 After the defendant was convicted of murder in the New
Jersey state court and sentenced to death, the State denied his
application for a writ of error.67 The defendant then sought a writ of
habeas corpus in federal court, arguing that New Jersey’s
discretionary appeal statute violated the U.S. Constitution.68 The
Supreme Court upheld the denial of habeas relief, repeating its earlier
words from McKane v. Durston69:
A review by an appellate court of the final judgment in a
criminal case, however grave the offence of which the accused
is convicted, was not at common law and is not now a
necessary element of due process of law. It is wholly within the
discretion of the State to allow or not to allow such a review. It
is, therefore clear that the right of appeal may be accorded by
the State to the accused upon such terms as in its wisdom may
be proper; and whether an appeal should be allowed, and if so,
under what circumstances or on what conditions, are matters
for each State to determine for itself.70

common rule is that the amount in controversy limits the entire litigation to one court, yet
there was never any serious question that in these cases due process of law was granted.”);
McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687–88 (1894) (disclaiming constitutional protection
for criminal appeals).
64. The Court denied at least two petitions for certiorari that explicitly raised the
issue. See Billotti v. Legursky, 975 F.2d 113, 114 (4th Cir. 1992) (originating in West
Virginia), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984 (1993); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4–7, Ratliff
v. Virginia, 516 U.S. 815 (1995) (No. 94-1982).
65. 156 U.S. 272, 273 (1895).
66. See id. at 272.
67. Id. at 272–73. The principal ground for the defendant’s attempted appeal was that
“all persons of his race and color were excluded in the drawing of the grand jury which
indicted him” and from the petit jury hearing his case; although there were AfricanAmerican citizens “qualified in all respects to act both as jurors and grand jurors,” they
“were purposely excluded, and always have been, by the sheriff of Warren county.” Id. at
273.
68. Id. at 273–75.
69. 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
70. Andrews, 156 U.S. at 275 (quoting McKane, 153 U.S. at 687–88).

CITE AS 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219

2013]

THE RIGHT TO APPEAL

Much can change over the course of a century, however, and
nearly ninety years later two members of the Supreme Court
expressed doubt that the denial of appellate review would be upheld
in the modern era. In a case challenging the quality of appellate
representation in a criminal appeal, Justice Brennan, in a dissent
joined by Justice Marshall, argued that if the Court were directly
presented with a case in which a criminal defendant had been denied
the right to appeal altogether, he would “have little doubt that we
would decide that a State must afford at least some opportunity for
review of convictions, whether through the familiar mechanism of
appeal or through some form of collateral proceeding.”71 He added
that “[t]here are few, if any, situations in our system of justice in
which a single judge is given unreviewable discretion over matters
concerning a person’s liberty or property.”72
Justice Brennan’s reference to “liberty or property” seems to
imply that his due process rationale would extend to both civil and
criminal cases. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has, on at
least seven separate occasions, declined an invitation to consider the
question of constitutional protection for appellate rights.73 Five of the
seven were civil cases arising in West Virginia,74 where the state lacks
an intermediate appellate court and had an overburdened state
supreme court with the power of discretionary review.75 Between
1999 and 2008, the West Virginia Supreme Court refused to hear
sixty-nine percent of civil appeals and eighty-four percent of criminal
appeals, leaving the losing party with no appeal from the trial court’s
judgment.76 As a result, some very large civil cases were denied
appellate review entirely; in one case, a $220 million verdict was
71. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 756 n.1 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
73. On the civil side, the Court denied certiorari petitions in Superior Highwall
Miners, Inc. v. Frye, 130 S. Ct. 2354 (2010); Camden-Clark Hospital Corp. v. Boggs, 553
U.S. 1017 (2008); NiSource, Inc. v. Estate of Tawney, 555 U.S. 1041 (2008); Central West
Virginia Energy Co. v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 555 U.S. 1045 (2008); and
Mountain Enterprises, Inc. v. Fitch, 541 U.S. 989 (2004). On the criminal side, the Court
denied certiorari petitions in Ratliff v. Virginia, 516 U.S. 815 (1995), and Billotti v.
Legursky, 507 U.S. 984 (1993).
74. See supra note 73.
75. See Lannom, supra note 58, at 23; Anderson, supra note 62. In December 2010,
the West Virginia Supreme Court adopted new appellate rules providing for a ruling on
each appeal. See W. VA. R. APP. P. 21 clerk’s cmt. Rulings may be made by nonprecedential memorandum opinions. Id.
76. W. VA. PUB. DEFENDER SERV., THE NEED FOR AN INTERMEDIATE COURT OF
APPEALS IN WEST VIRGINIA WITH AN APPEAL OF RIGHT IN CRIMINAL CASES 5 (2009),
available
at
http://www.wvpds.org/PDS.intermediate%20court%20Proposal%20and
%20Argument.pdf.
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denied appellate review, and in another case a $400 million verdict
was similarly denied review.77 Two remaining cases were both
criminal convictions, one of which arose in West Virginia and the
other in Virginia, which provides only discretionary review for most
criminal convictions.78
The question of constitutional protection for appellate rights will
likely continue to arise in both civil and criminal cases until the
Supreme Court agrees to address the issue. This Part examines
possible bases for such a right. It first looks at the historical protection
for appellate remedies and concludes that although some scholars
have argued that historical practice supports the inclusion of appellate
remedies within an originalist conception of due process, the evidence
to support that position is not strong enough to be likely to carry the
day with the Supreme Court. This Part then examines the role of
contemporary practice in the due process calculus, and determines
that there is a stronger argument for considering contemporary
practice in the due process analysis, given how interwoven appellate
remedies have become in both the civil and criminal justice systems.
Finally, using contemporary practice, this Part analyzes protection for
appeals as of right under the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test.
A.

Limited Historical Protection for Appellate Remedies

Almost every legal system has provided for a second level of
review in some situations. As one scholar has pointed out, “The
underlying sentiment that there is (or must be) a higher authority
which may be consulted to correct injustice has been ingrained in
formal, governmental dispute-resolution systems throughout recorded
history.”79 Thus, while ancient procedures do not match modern ones,
there is at least some historical support for a right of appeal. The
extent of this support, however, is less than clear; “[n]o part of the
history of United States courts presents such a tangle of detail as does
the handling of appeals.”80
On the civil side, scholars have argued that appellate remedies
were part of the due process rights recognized either at common law

77. Adam Liptak, U.S. Supreme Court Is Asked to Fix Troubled West Virginia Justice
System, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008, at A41.
78. See Davidow & Wright, supra note 43, at 5.
79. J. Clark Kelso, A Report on the California Appellate System, 45 HASTINGS L.J.
433, 433 (1994).
80. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Origin of the Appeal in America, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 913,
918 (1997) (quoting JAMES WILLIAM HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE
LAW MAKERS 101 (1950)).
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or at least by 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.81
They have rested this argument on the fact that the “writ of error,”
which facilitated the correction of legal error by a higher court, was
allowed “as a matter of right” under English common law.82 The term
“appeal” was primarily used on the equity side, and referred to review
of factual matters rather than being limited to legal error.83 In criminal
cases, however, review was much more limited, and, somewhat
counterintuitively, was more readily available in the least serious
criminal cases than in the most serious.84 Review was provided as of
right in misdemeanor cases, as long as “the defendant made a
showing to the attorney-general of sufficient probable cause,” but, in
capital cases (like the New Jersey case discussed above85), “such a
writ was granted only upon the express consent of the attorneygeneral, which was a matter of grace.”86
In the early days of the United States, the right to appellate
review was significantly limited. There was no right of review for
criminal convictions in federal cases until 1879.87 On the civil side, an
appeal as of right was more common. The federal judiciary statute
81. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, supra
note 12, at 7–8, 2008 WL 4360892, at *7–8 (tracing back to colonial times the sentiment
that guaranteed appeals for civil litigants were essential to confidence in the judicial
system).
82. David Rossman, “Were There No Appeal”: The History of Review in American
Criminal Courts, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 518, 541 (1990); see also Gasperini v.
Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 452 (1996) (“At common law, review of
judgments was had only on writ of error, limited to questions of law.”).
83. See Bilder, supra note 80, at 914 (“The legal procedure known as ‘the appeal’ did
not refer to what we now think of as an ‘appeal’—the correction by a higher court of
errors of law made by a lower court. Instead, the ‘appeal’ referred to a procedure under
which a higher tribunal could completely and broadly rehear and redecide not only the
law, but also the entire facts of a case.”); James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original
Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’s Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515,
1570 (2001) (“Both appeals from proceedings in equity and admiralty, and writs of error
to secure review of judgments at common law, were available to appellants and petitioners
in error as a matter of right.”).
84. Until the 1700s, any review in criminal cases was allowed only ex gratia, as a
matter of grace and discretion by the Crown. In the eighteenth century, however, review in
minor cases was delegated to the courts and allowed as of right. R. v. Wilkes (1770), 4
Burr. 2527, 98 Eng. Rep. 327, 339 (K.B.). In more serious cases of treason and felony,
however, review remained available only by permission of the Crown. In these cases, the
defendant was said to have “forfeited all he has to the Crown,” and the sovereign could
therefore “exercise his pleasure whether or not to give it back.” See 2 JOEL PRENTISS
BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1362, at 1176–77 (2d ed. 1913).
85. See supra note 65.
86. Rossman, supra note 82, at 541.
87. Fins, supra note 12, at 296. (“[T]he remedy of appeal to a reviewing court
developed very slowly. . . . [F]rom 1789 to 1879, a period of 90 years, a person who was
convicted criminally by a federal court had no right of review.”).
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incorporated such a right, but only in cases meeting an amount in
controversy requirement.88 Not all states extended such appeal
rights.89 Some states were slow to develop an appellate court system.90
Others who had offered appeals as of right for civil cases at the time
of their founding subsequently eliminated that right when later faced
with crowded dockets.91 While there was greater protection at
common law for appellate review in civil cases than in criminal ones,
this preference did not take root in every state; for example, Louisiana
constitutionalized a right to criminal appeals in 1845, specifying at
the time that the state supreme court should provide them “preference
over civil cases.”92 Thus, while the historical argument for due
process protection is stronger for civil appeals than for criminal
appeals, historical practice is by no means clear. This lack of clarity,
combined with the Supreme Court’s own refusal to extend due
process protection to the right of appeal suggests that the Court will
be unlikely to locate such a right in an originalist conception of
historical practice.
B.

The Evolution of Due Process

However, even if the Supreme Court is unpersuaded that
historical practice demonstrates a due process protection of appellate
remedies, it may nevertheless decide to extend such a right in light of
modern practice. As one legal scholar has noted, “[W]hen it comes to
what types of ‘procedures’ are ‘due,’ almost no one embraces

88. See Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 606 & n.22
(1985).
89. See Rossman, supra note 82, at 522 (noting that the First Judiciary Act in 1789
permitted writs of error in civil cases exceeding $2,000 in value, but “made no explicit
provision for writs of error in criminal cases”); see also James E. Pfander, JurisdictionStripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L.
REV. 1433, 1461–62 (2000) (noting that although “the scope of review differed,” for the
appeal in equity and the writ of error at common law, “both forms of appellate review
were available as a matter of right and did not depend on the exercise of equitable
discretion by the superior court,” leading to the creation of “a set of geographically
convenient inferior federal tribunals in order to avoid the necessity of appeals to the
distant and expensive Supreme Court in every case”).
90. Rossman, supra note 82, at 543 (noting that Georgia did not establish a state
supreme court until 1848).
91. See Meredith R. Miller, A Picture of the New York Court of Appeals at the Time
of Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 28 PACE L. REV. 357, 372 (2008) (noting that in
New York, “with the court’s docket still overburdened, the legislature eliminated appeals
as of right in most civil cases, effective on June 1, 1917”).
92. Jeremiah E. Goulka, The First Constitutional Right to Criminal Appeal:
Louisiana’s Constitution of 1845 and the Clash of the Common Law and Natural Law
Traditions, 17 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 151, 195 (2002).

CITE AS 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219

2013]

THE RIGHT TO APPEAL

originalist methods of interpretation.”93 Instead, most observers agree
that the specific requisites of due process can and will change over
time, even, on occasion, doing so “exceedingly quickly.”94 The
Supreme Court itself has written that “[d]ue process, as this Court
often has said, is a flexible concept that varies with the particular
situation.”95
Given the flexibility of the due process analysis, the Court may
well be persuaded that even if the right to appeal in state court was
not considered to be an integral part of due process in 1868, it has
certainly become one by the current time. In describing the
importance of an appellate remedy in the modern system, observers
have pointed out that “[a]lthough its origins are neither constitutional
nor ancient, the right has become, in a word, sacrosanct.”96 In modern
American practice, “the availability of review by a ‘multi judge’
appellate tribunal [has become] an essential safeguard.”97
International law likewise recognizes the importance of appellate
remedies; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
provides that “[e]veryone convicted of a crime shall have the right to
his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal
according to law.”98
The Supreme Court has not provided a bright-line rule for
determining “when procedures that satisfied the demands of due
process in the past may be rendered unconstitutional by changes in
the facts and circumstances.”99 In the personal jurisdiction context,
the Court has stated that the requirements of due process “can be as
readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no
93. Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning? On
Originalism, Due Process, Procedural Innovation . . . and Parking Tickets, 60 OKLA. L.
REV. 1, 2 (2007).
94. Alex S. Ellerson, Note, The Right to Appeal and Appellate Procedural Reform, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 373, 382 (1991); see also Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U.
PA. L. REV. 1309, 1362 (2012) (“[C]urrent due process doctrine strongly suggests that
requiring procedural safeguards to adapt to changing facts and circumstances is faithful to
the Court’s understanding of the dictates of procedural due process.”).
95. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990).
96. Dalton, supra note 12, at 62.
97. Fins, supra note 12, at 296.
98. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 54 (Dec. 16, 1966); see also
Cavallaro, supra note 50, at 983–84 & n.135 (noting that “federal implementing
legislation may yet be necessary” to incorporate this ICCPR provision into domestic law,
as “at the time of ratification, every state did provide for some form of appellate review,
but . . . states are free to abrogate those rights where they are statutory or to amend them
where protected by state constitutions”).
99. Parkin, supra note 94, at 1361.
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longer justified as by the adoption of new procedures that are
inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional heritage.”100 In
the civil context more broadly, the Court has been willing to consider
both “[m]odern practice” and “common-law practice” in its due
process analysis,101 and has applied the Mathews v. Eldridge102 threefactor balancing test (discussed at greater length in Part II.C.) for
determining “what process is due.”103
It is less clear whether the Supreme Court would likewise
consider modern practice in the criminal context. The Court’s due
process jurisdiction has been more restrictive in criminal than in civil
cases. In Medina v. California,104 a decision upholding a state’s
decision to place the burden of proof on criminal defendants in
competency hearings, the Court limited the use of the Mathews
balancing test in criminal cases, holding that it “does not provide the
appropriate framework for assessing the validity of state procedural
rules which, like the one at bar, are part of the criminal process.”105
Instead, the Court concluded that it was appropriate to defer to state
choices and to conclude that a state’s procedural practice is “not
subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless ‘it
offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’ ”106
But even in the criminal context, the Court has not limited its
due process inquiry to historical practice alone, as it demonstrated in
Medina.107 After “[d]iscerning no historical basis” for concluding that
“the allocation of the burden of proving incompetence to the
defendant violates due process,” the Court also “turn[ed] to consider
whether the rule transgresses any recognized principle of
‘fundamental fairness’ in operation.”108 Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence, joined by Justice Souter, noted that the Court’s opinion
did not foreclose an evolving view of due process requirements; she
wrote, “While I agree with the Court that historical pedigree can give
a procedural practice a presumption of constitutionality, the
presumption must surely be rebuttable.”109 As a result, she concluded
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 426, 435 (1994).
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id. at 335.
505 U.S. 437 (1977).
Id. at 443.
Id. at 445 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201–02 (1977)).
Id.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 454 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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that the majority opinion should be read “to allow some weight to be
given countervailing considerations of fairness in operation,
considerations much like those the Court evaluated in Mathews.”110
Legal scholars have also agreed that Justice O’Connor’s reading
comports with the Court’s criminal due process jurisprudence, as “an
exclusively historical approach is inconsistent with a large number of
the Court’s prior criminal cases.”111 As Justice O’Connor had pointed
out, in cases dealing with such diverse matters as psychiatric
evaluation for insanity claims, the potential for prejudicial media
publicity, and the standards for handling potentially exculpatory
evidence, the Court has historically applied a flexible due process
standard.112
Thus, the prevalence of appellate remedies in modern practice
may support the extension of due process protection to the appellate
process. On the civil side, the typical test for procedural due process
is the Mathews balancing test.113 On the criminal side, support of the
Mathews test would probably not be enough by itself; an advocate
would also need to show that the right to appeal can be “ranked as
fundamental” in modern practice.114
C.

Applying the Mathews Balancing Test

In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court adopted a threefactor balancing test for determining “what process is due.”115 In the
decades since it has been adopted, the Mathews test has become the
most commonly used yardstick for measuring the boundaries of due

110. Id.
111. Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The
Supreme Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303, 423
(2001); Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 1, 15 (2006); Bruce J. Winick, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof in Determining
Competency to Stand Trial: An Analysis of Medina v. California and the Supreme Court’s
New Due Process Methodology in Criminal Cases, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 817, 827 (1993)
(“In those cases, cited by Justice O’Connor but ignored by the majority, the Court held
that the Due Process Clause required procedural safeguards despite a lack of historical
tradition.”).
112. Medina, 505 U.S. at 454 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (providing a due process
right for a state-paid psychiatric evaluation in support of insanity claims); Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 335 (1966) (providing due process protection from prejudicial
media publicity); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (requiring the production of
potentially exculpatory evidence); Winick, supra note 111, at 826 n.57.
113. See infra Part II.C.
114. Medina, 505 U.S. at 445 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201–02
(1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–35 (1976).
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process.116 The Mathews standard requires courts to weigh (1) “the
private interest that will be affected by the official action” and (2)
“the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards” against (3) “the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.”117 The Mathews test essentially applies a
cost-benefit analysis to procedural due process; the Court noted that
“[a]t some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the
individual affected by the administrative action and to society in
terms of increased insurance that the action is just, may be
outweighed by the cost.”118 This cost-benefit analysis is not entirely
unbounded, however. Although it applies to the “additional or
substitute procedural safeguards” under consideration, it does not
constrain those procedures necessary to ensure a basic level of
fairness; courts have noted that “[t]he benefits of efficiency can never
be purchased at the cost of fairness.”119
What, then, are the private interests protected by the appellate
process? The error-correction function of appellate review protects
litigants from being wrongfully deprived of property (in civil
litigation) or life and liberty (in criminal litigation). These interests go
to the heart of the Due Process Clause, which by its very terms
protects against the deprivation of “life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.”120
The value of appellate safeguards for preventing such
deprivation is likewise significant. Examining the reversal rates
described above demonstrates the value of appellate protection.121 In
civil cases, state appellate courts reversed the underlying judgment in
whole or in part in approximately one-third of the cases.122 In cases
where the consequence of erroneous property deprivation was the

116. See California ex rel. Lockyer v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 329 F.3d 700,
709 n.8 (9th Cir. 2003).
117. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
118. Id. at 348.
119. Malcolm v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346, 350, 354 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[I]t is
possible to go too far in the interests of expediency and to sacrifice basic fairness in the
process.”).
120. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”); id. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
121. See supra Part I.A.
122. See supra Part I.A.
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highest (that is, in cases with the largest verdicts), appellate remedies
were even more valuable; “nearly half (48%) of appeals from trials
with damage awards of over $1 million were reversed or modified by
the appellate courts.”123 Without the right to an appeal, civil
defendants facing a large verdict would be forced to absorb an
erroneous damage judgment nearly half the time. By any measure,
this is significant “risk of an erroneous deprivation.”124
On the criminal side, the incidence of reversal is lower,125 but the
rights protected—life and liberty—are even more fundamental. Given
the value of these rights, even a small risk of erroneous deprivation is
troubling.126 As in civil cases, the defendants at the extremes of the
sentencing continuum are also the ones most protected by allowing a
robust appellate process—researchers have found that defendants
facing the longest sentences were more likely to obtain some relief on
appeal than were those defendants given middling sentences, while
defendants facing lower sentences were more likely to obtain
complete relief.127
The other side of the Mathews equation—the fiscal cost and
administrative burden of providing appeals as of right—cannot
outweigh the benefits provided by a robust appellate system; as one
scholar has noted, “[I]f appeals were so unduly burdensome . . . it
seems unlikely that forty-seven states would have enacted a first
appeal as of right in criminal cases and the other three would have
enacted discretionary appellate procedures.”128 When donning the
Rawlsian “veil of ignorance”129 to determine what procedures an
individual would expect if facing either a large civil verdict or
criminal sentence, most individuals would likely find the cost of
123. COHEN, supra note 20, at 6.
124. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 345 (1979).
125. See supra Part I.A.
126. Such reversals may arise either because the defendant was factually innocent or
because the defendant was denied important procedural protections. See Arkin, supra note
8, at 548 (“If factual innocence is the ultimate criterion, then current reversal and sentence
modification rates may overstate the additional accuracy provided by an appeal because
many of these determinations reflect procedural defects rather than judgments that the
defendants were, in fact, possibly innocent.”).
127. CHAPPER & HANSON, supra note 34, at 6 (“ ‘Winning big’ (i.e., an acquittal or a
new trial) occurs most frequently in appeals with the least serious sentence; appeals
involving the longest sentences show the highest percentage of ‘winning little’ (i.e.,
resentencing or other modification).”).
128. Arkin, supra note 8, at 549.
129. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136–42 (1971) (developing the concept
of a “veil of ignorance,” which asks what societal rules parties would make if they were
forced to act without knowledge of whether those rules would prove beneficial or
detrimental to them personally).
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appellate procedure a small one to pay for the protection against
erroneous deprivation of life, liberty, or property.
In fact, the electorate of almost every U.S. jurisdiction has
chosen to support just this balance: the federal system and nearly all
states already provide an appeal of right even absent a constitutional
obligation to do so. In the states without statutory protection for
appeals, the electorate’s inability to don such a Rawlsian veil has
hindered the adoption of such a right. On the civil side, corporations
who believe they are likely to face large verdicts support expanded
appellate rights, and plaintiffs’ attorneys who rely on enforcing large
judgments oppose them.130 On the criminal side, felon
disenfranchisement laws means that those facing significant prison
sentences may be excluded entirely from the electorate.131 The
extension of appellate rights has thus become politicized in recent
decades,132 and a state facing such questions today is therefore in a
different position than a state that adopted broad appellate rights a
century ago.
For the jurisdictions who have already created such a statutory
right, however, constitutionalizing the appellate process would not
increase costs at all—though it would prohibit cutting existing
appellate rights to remedy a budget shortfall.133 In a jurisdiction
without mandatory appellate rights, there would be an added cost in
providing an appeal as of right in every civil case.134 Expansion of the
court system requires funding, and adding additional cases to
appellate dockets is likely to delay the resolution of pending cases.
The administrative burden is somewhat lighter given that the
130. See supra Part I.
131. Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1504 n.146 (2005).
132. See supra Part I.B.
133. See Parker & Chapman, supra note 10, at 582 (“Discretionary review would save
time, money, and effort and would more honestly describe the system currently in place, a
system in which courts exercise discretion behind a facade of deliberation.”). See
generally Barrow, supra note 10 (arguing that reform of Virginia’s discretionary appeal
would be a cost-effective way of improving the quality of appellate justice); Lay, supra
note 10 (arguing for the adoption of discretionary appeal in federal cases).
134. It should be noted, however, that when the West Virginia Supreme Court adopted
a new rule providing appellate review as of right, it did so without additional funding or
resources. Because the rule was changed in late 2012, it remains to be seen how well it
will work in practice. Additionally, because the change was adopted through the
rulemaking process, it remains subject to change by the court. See Robin Jean Davis,
Supreme Court Justice of the W. Va. Supreme Court, Revised Rules of Appellate
Procedure
Modernize
the
Appellate
Process,
W.
V A.
LAW.,
http://www.courtswv.gov/public-resources/press/cj-column/Davis-July-Sep-2010.htm (last
visited July 17, 2012).
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appellate infrastructure already exists. Even states with a purely
discretionary system of appeals could integrate an appeal as of right
without changing their court structure, although they might face the
fiscal cost of added staff and a higher administrative burden if the
same number of judges were to issue opinions on a larger number of
cases. West Virginia’s new court rule providing review of all appeals
will be a good test case for whether such review can be done with
additional funding; even without legislative support, the court
quintupled the number of cases decided in the first four months of
operating under the new rules.135
III. DOCTRINAL CONSISTENCY AND APPELLATE REVIEW
The fundamental importance of private interests which appellate
error correction protects—and the risk of erroneous deprivation of
life, liberty, or property without such process—may tip the balance in
favor of recognizing a constitutional due process right of appeal. As
the American Bar Association has pointed out, appellate review is not
merely a desirable part of legal practice—it is, instead, a
“fundamental element of procedural fairness.”136
This Part goes beyond the Mathews analysis to examine how the
right to appeal has become ensconced among the procedures required
to ensure basic fairness. It analyzes the role of appellate remedies in
the development and consistent application of legal rules. Whereas
the prior Part analyzed the right to appeal as a matter of freestanding
procedure, this Part puts the right within its doctrinal context. It
argues that the Supreme Court’s disavowal of such a right is
inconsistent with the way the Court has developed constitutional
doctrines related to the appellate process.
In examining the right to appeal as part of the larger doctrinal
framework, it is necessary to go beyond the bare requirements of the
Mathews procedural due process analysis. As other scholars have
noted, Mathews itself is not ideal for determining when judicial
review (either by a district court judge or on appeal) is needed; these
questions “raise issues lying beyond the Mathews framework.”137 As

135. Margaret Workman, An Intermediate Appeals Court Is a Bad Idea; W.Va.
Doesn’t Need It; Taxpayers Cannot Afford It, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, June 13, 2011,
at P5A.
136. 3 AM. BAR ASS’N, JUDICIAL ADMIN. DIV., STANDARDS RELATING TO
APPELLATE COURTS § 3.10, at 18 (1994).
137. Fallon, supra note 9, at 331; see also Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process, 59
STAN. L. REV. 601, 643 (2006) (“Mathews’s utilitarianism created intellectual space for
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the Supreme Court has recognized, procedures that are required for
fundamental fairness are not subject to restriction under the Mathews
test.138 Assessing whether a practice ranks as fundamental brings
together the substantive and procedural strands of the due process
analysis; both of the strands, at their core, protect against the arbitrary
application of government power.139
With regard to appellate review, the surrounding doctrine
suggests that a right to appeal has indeed become a fundamental
protection of litigant rights in both civil and criminal litigation. First,
the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has effectively
created a right to meaningful appeal for indigent criminal defendants.
Second, the Court’s treatment of criminal appeals mooted by the
defendant’s death expresses a degree of deference to the appellate
process that is inconsistent with a lack of appellate rights. Finally, the
Court’s requirement of heightened review on appeal in punitive
damage and libel cases can only be effective if there is also a right to
appellate review in the first instance.
A.

Equal Protection and Due Process on Appeal

Although the Supreme Court has not yet acknowledged a due
process right to appeal, it has relied on the equal protection doctrine
to prohibit states from withholding statutory appellate remedies from
indigent criminal defendants. This trend began with Griffin v.
Illinois,140 in which the Court reversed a state-court judgment that
allowed non-capital defendants to appeal only if they paid for a copy
of the trial record and transcript, and ordered that “[d]estitute
defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as
defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts.”141 The
plurality opinion reiterated its statement from McKane v. Durston that
states are “not required by the Federal Constitution to provide
appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all,” but it specified
that the lack of an appellate requirement did not mean that a “[s]tate
that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that discriminates
against some convicted defendants on account of their poverty.”142

undue process claims. Its balancing test placed governmental interests in decision costs on
the same plane as private interests in process modifications.”).
138. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992).
139. See Fallon, supra note 9, at 372.
140. 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (plurality opinion).
141. Id. at 19.
142. Id. at 18 (citing McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894)).
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Although the plurality opinion in Griffin seemed to rest on an
equal-protection ground, it emphasized the importance of appellate
review in general. The opinion noted that “[a]ll of the States now
provide some method of appeal from criminal convictions,
recognizing the importance of appellate review to a correct
adjudication of guilt or innocence.”143 It also recognized how reliant
the states have become on the error-correction function of appeals,
stating that “[s]tatistics show that a substantial proportion of criminal
convictions are reversed by state appellate courts” and acknowledging
that “deny[ing] adequate review to the poor means that many of them
may lose their life, liberty or property because of unjust convictions
which appellate courts would set aside.”144
Perhaps because this rhetoric sounded as if the Court might be
willing to recognize a due process right of appeal, Justice Frankfurter
concurred separately in an attempt to forestall such an interpretation.
He noted that it might be tempting to find a due process basis for such
protection: “The right to an appeal from a conviction for crime is
today so established that this leads to the easy assumption that it is
fundamental to the protection of life and liberty and therefore a
necessary ingredient of due process of law.”145 Nevertheless, he
cautioned that such an interpretation would be in error: “It is
significant that no appeals from convictions in the federal courts were
afforded (with roundabout exceptions negligible for present purposes)
for nearly a hundred years . . . it is now settled that due process of law
does not require a State to afford review of criminal judgments.”146
He therefore suggested that states who found themselves overly
burdened by facilitating indigent appeals could choose to reduce
appellate rights for all.147
In spite of Justice Frankfurter’s concerns, states did not retract
appellate rights after Griffin—instead, appellate practices continued
to develop, and the Supreme Court came nearer to recognizing the
fundamental importance of appellate remedies. In Eskridge v.
Washington State Board of Prison Terms & Paroles,148 the Court
143. Id.
144. Id. at 18–19.
145. Id. at 20 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 21.
147. Id. at 24 (“But in order to avoid or minimize abuse and waste, a State may
appropriately hedge about the opportunity to prove a conviction wrong. When a State not
only gives leave for appellate correction of trial errors but must pay for the cost of its
exercise by the indigent, it may protect itself so that frivolous appeals are not subsidized
and public moneys not needlessly spent.”).
148. 357 U.S. 214, 215 (1958).
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struck down a law that authorized a trial judge to order a transcript at
public expense only “if in his opinion justice will thereby be
promoted.”149 Although this procedure instituted an extra level of
discretionary review by having the trial judge review the case to see if
an appeal was warranted, the Court nevertheless held that the case
was controlled by Griffin because it discriminated against indigent
defendants in the appeal process; those who could pay for a trial
transcript did not need to persuade the trial court that justice would be
promoted by allowing an appeal.150
In Douglas v. California,151 the Court further expanded the
Griffin anti-discrimination rule to include the right to counsel on
appeal. Specifically, it held that the state’s failure to appoint counsel
for an indigent’s appeal violated equal protection:
Where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit
of counsel’s examination into the record, research of the law,
and marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent,
already burdened by a preliminary determination that his case
is without merit, is forced to shift for himself.152
Again, while the Court’s reasoning focused on the different situations
of rich and poor, the Court’s rhetoric also hinted at the importance of
the appellate process more generally; the Court noted that without
appointed counsel, an indigent defendant would be left “without a
champion on appeal” and would thereby be “deprived” of “showing
that his appeal ha[d] hidden merit” beyond what was shown in the
trial record.153
Interestingly, the Court retreated a bit from its equal protection
jurisprudence in Ross v. Moffitt154 and appeared to move toward a due
process principle. In Ross, the question before the Court was whether
an indigent defendant was entitled to counsel for a second level of
appeal—specifically, the defendant had an appeal as of right in the
North Carolina Court of Appeals (and was provided counsel for that
appeal), but sought further review in the Supreme Court of North
Carolina.155 The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that a strict equal
protection analysis would give rise to a requirement for appellate
counsel: rich defendants, after all, had access to counsel to assist in
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id. at 216.
372 U.S. 353, 355–56 (1963).
Id. at 358.
Id. at 356.
417 U.S. 600 (1974).
See id. at 602.
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petitioning the state supreme court.156 Nevertheless, the Court
acknowledged that the “precise rationale for the Griffin and Douglas
lines of cases has never been explicitly stated,” and noted that “some
support” was “derived from the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and some from the Due Process Clause of
that Amendment.”157 In an analysis that combined the two clauses, the
Court determined that failure to provide appellate counsel for the first
appeal as of right would unconstitutionally discriminate against the
poor, but that the provision of counsel in a second layer of appellate
review was a choice left to the state; any remaining disadvantage
would be “far less than the handicap borne by the indigent defendant
denied counsel on his initial appeal as of right in Douglas.”158
In spite of the Court’s unwillingness to acknowledge a
constitutional right of appeal in criminal cases, its jurisprudence
nonetheless supports such a view. As the Court acknowledged in
Ross, the Equal Protection Clause cannot be doing all the work—if
equal protection were the only rationale, there would be no basis on
which to distinguish a first level of appeal from a second level.159 The
Court’s willingness to find a constitutional right to a trial record and
to appellate counsel suggests that the Court recognizes the
fundamental importance of the appellate process. The Court’s
unwillingness to extend the right to counsel beyond a single appeal as
of right further suggests a limiting principle—the existence of one
appeal as of right may be fundamentally woven into the fabric of the
justice system, but that a second level of review is not likewise
engrained in a basic notion of fairness.160 The Court’s subsequent
jurisprudence on effective assistance of counsel on appeal further
reinforces this distinction. When a state provides a right of direct
appeal, criminal defendants have a right to effective assistance of
counsel on appeal—and this right means that counsel cannot simply
decline to file an appeal they believe is meritless, but must instead
156. See id. at 616.
157. Id. at 608–09.
158. Id. at 616, 619.
159. Id. at 609 n.8 (quoting the circuit court’s opinion, which noted that if Douglas
rested on equal protection alone, “the same concepts of fairness and equality, which
require counsel in a first appeal of right, require counsel in other and subsequent
discretionary appeals” (quoting Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650, 655 (4th Cir. 1973))).
160. Cf. Emily Garcia Uhrig, A Case for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Habeas
Corpus, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 541, 544 (2009) (arguing that “due process and equal
protection principles” would dictate a similar result when the direct appeal process did not
afford an opportunity to raise critical issues, and thus “whenever habeas petitioners seek
review of claims for which habeas corpus provides the first opportunity for judicial
review”).
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brief any issue “that might arguably support the appeal.”161 On
collateral or discretionary review, however, such procedures are not
required.162
B.

The Treatment of Criminal Appeals Mooted by Appellant’s
Death

The treatment of criminal convictions mooted by the appellant’s
death also demonstrates the value placed on the appellate process in
the criminal justice system. If an individual convicted of a crime in
federal district court dies while the case is on appeal, the circuit courts
of appeals require the conviction to be abated ab initio—that is, the
court will not merely dismiss the pending appeal, but will also enter
“orders remanding [such] cases to the district courts with instructions
to vacate the judgment and to dismiss the indictment or
information.”163 At one time, the Supreme Court followed the same
rule for petitions for certiorari.164 However, it later overruled that
decision, choosing only to dismiss the certiorari petition and not the
underlying case.165 The shift was interpreted by the circuit courts as
an acknowledgement of the different roles played by the discretionary
certiorari system versus the appeals of right allowed in the circuit
courts:
The Supreme Court may dismiss the petition without
prejudicing the rights of a deceased petitioner, for he has
already had the benefit of the appellate review of his conviction
to which he was entitled of right. In contrast, when an appeal
has been taken from a criminal conviction to the court of
appeals and death has deprived the accused of his right to our
decision, the interests of justice ordinarily require that he not
stand convicted without resolution of the merits of his appeal,
which is an “integral part of [our] system for finally
adjudicating [his] guilt or innocence.”166
When appeals as of right are statutorily granted (as they are in
the federal courts), dismissing the indictment—rather than merely the
appeal itself—only makes sense if the appeal is considered to be a
161. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
162. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 558 (1987).
163. Cavallaro, supra note 50, at 951.
164. Durham v. United States, 401 U.S. 481, 483 (1971).
165. Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325, 325 (1976) (“The petition for certiorari is
therefore dismissed. To the extent that Durham v. United States may be inconsistent with
this ruling, Durham is overruled.” (citation omitted)).
166. United States v. Pauline, 625 F.2d 684, 685 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956)).
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fundamental part of the criminal process. In other words, the
underlying principle cannot just be that “punishment is impossible
without the body of the defendant”—if this were the only reason for
the practice, dismissal of the appeal as moot would be sufficient, or at
the least the appeal could consider the conviction in order to
determine the propriety of monetary forfeitures or penalties.167
Abating the case ab initio, however, supports the view that
“punishment is illegitimate without appellate review of the trial court
conviction,” and that there is “not only an irrevocable individual right
of appeal, but also a societal need for certitude that is dependent upon
appellate review.”168 Nevertheless, a number of courts place such
weight on the value of appellate review that they extend the
abatement remedy beyond the conviction itself, and likewise vacate
the collateral punishments of “criminal forfeitures and fines.”169
Of course, the Supreme Court itself has not required such
abatement of criminal appeals as a part of constitutional practice.
Nevertheless, the circuit courts’ treatment of the cases aligns with the
Supreme Court’s emphasis on the protection of constitutional rights
by and through appeals in criminal cases. Thus, for example, the
Court “has prescribed and applied new requirements of de novo
appellate review of lower courts’ decisions of some (but not all)
mixed questions of federal constitutional law and fact in criminal
cases”—even while professing that there is no constitutional right to
appeal and without “specify[ing] what provision of the Constitution
authorizes it to so regulate criminal appeals in states that do choose to
allow them, much less to explain why it so interpreted this
unidentified provision.”170 In these criminal-law cases, the Court left
unclear whether state-level appellate courts were obligated to apply
the same appellate standard;171 as discussed in the next Section,
167. Cavallaro, supra note 50, at 956.
168. Id. at 956–57.
169. United States v. Christopher, 273 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2001); see also
Cavallaro, supra note 50, at 961 (“Some courts erase all collateral aspects of a conviction
as having no independent force absent the convicted offender.”). It should be noted,
however, that this approach is a matter of custom rather than law—and it is a custom that
the states do not uniformly follow. See, e.g., State v. Gartland, 694 A.2d 564, 568 (N.J.
1997).
170. Coombs, supra note 59, at 542–43 (discussing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.
690 (1996)).
171. Id. at 551; see also State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1265 (Utah 1993) (“[A]fter
reflecting on the principles governing the choice of a particular standard of review and
considering the law on analogous questions, we have concluded that this court is not
required to apply federal standards of review when presented with challenges to trial court
determinations made under federal law.”).
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however, the Court did require state appellate courts to do so in the
related area of punitive damages.172
C.

Heightened Appellate Review in Certain Civil Cases

The Supreme Court’s civil jurisprudence also relies on the
assumption that appellate remedies will buttress constitutional rights.
As some scholars and litigants have pointed out, this assumption is
most easily visible in the Court’s jurisprudence on punitive
damages.173 Two decades ago, a plurality of the Supreme Court
asserted that the Due Process Clause prohibits a court from making a
punitive damage award that is “so excessive that it must be deemed
an arbitrary deprivation of property without due process of law.”174
A year later, in Honda Motor Company v. Oberg,175 the Court
struck down a judgment for punitive damages in a case arising out of
an Oregon state court, holding that judicial review of punitive damage
awards was required as a matter of constitutional due process.176 At
the time the case arose, a provision of the Oregon Constitution
prohibited judicial review of punitive damage awards “unless the
court [could] affirmatively say there [was] no evidence to support the
verdict.”177 A jury awarded the plaintiff $5 million in a product
liability case against Honda, and both the Oregon Court of Appeals
and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the verdict.178 The U.S.
Supreme Court reversed that judgment and remanded to the Oregon
Supreme Court for further review.179 Although the Court’s opinion
focused on judicial review rather than appellate review (and it
therefore left open the possibility that the trial judge’s review of the
jury’s verdict could suffice), the opinion did state in dicta that “the
availability of both ‘meaningful and adequate review by the trial
court’ and subsequent appellate review” would give rise “to a strong
presumption of validity.”180

172. See infra Part III.C.
173. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Academy of Appellate Lawyers
in Support of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7–10, Mountain Enters. v. Fitch, 541
U.S. 989 (2004) (No. 03-1223), 2004 WL 692247, at *7–10; Brief of Amici Curiae Law
Professors In Support of Petitioner, supra note 12, at 7, 2008 WL 4360892, at *7.
174. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453 (1993).
175. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
176. Id. at 418.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 435.
180. Id. at 420–21 (emphasis added) (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp.,
509 U.S. 443, 457 (1993)).

CITE AS 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219

2013]

THE RIGHT TO APPEAL

The Supreme Court subsequently addressed the standard of
review on appeal in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool
Group.181 In that case, a jury had awarded $4.5 million in punitive
damages in a trademark infringement case.182 The trial judge
“considered, and rejected, arguments that the punitive damages were
‘grossly excessive.’ ”183 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment after
reviewing it under an “abuse of discretion” standard.184 The Supreme
Court reversed the judgment, holding that the appellate court had a
duty to review the judgment under a non-deferential de novo standard
of review.185 The Court relied on an analysis of institutional
competence in applying the three guideposts of a due process review
of punitive damages. It concluded that the district court might have a
“somewhat superior vantage” in reviewing “the degree or
reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct,” but that the trial and
appellate courts were equally good at determining “the disparity
between the harm (or potential harm) suffered by the plaintiff and the
punitive damages award” and that appellate courts had greater
expertise in reviewing “the difference between the punitive damages
awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in
comparable cases.”186 The Court therefore held that appellate courts
must conduct a de novo review of punitive damages.187 Although
Cooper Industries applied to the federal circuits, the Supreme Court
soon extended the de novo review requirement to state courts of
appeals as well.188
The Court’s requirement of heightened review in punitive
damages cases undermines previous statements that no such right
exists. Indeed, the Court’s language, though written to explain why
deferential review is insufficient in the punitive damages context,
actually reads more as a defense of appellate review in general. First,
the Court pointed to the error correction function of appellate review,
noting that “[e]xacting appellate review ensures that an award of
punitive damages is based upon an ‘application of law, rather than a
181. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
182. Id. at 429.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 430–31.
185. Id. at 436.
186. Id. at 440.
187. Id. at 436.
188. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003) (noting, in
a case arising in a Utah state court, that “[w]e reiterated the importance of these three
guideposts in Cooper Industries and mandated appellate courts to conduct de novo review
of a trial court’s application of them to the jury’s award”).
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decisionmaker’s caprice.’ ”189 Second, the Court noted that “de novo
review tends to unify precedent and stabilize the law,” and it
expresses hope that the amorphous concept of “gross excessiveness”
will gain stability and meaning through case-by-case application at
the appellate level.190 The law-stabilizing and unifying effects are also
classic benefits of appellate review.191 Thus, the basis for requiring
heightened appellate review of punitive damage awards mirrors the
benefits of appellate review in general; it is very difficult to reconcile
the Court’s requirement of de novo appellate review of punitive
damages with a system in which no appellate review is required at all.
Moreover, at least one state has interpreted the Supreme Court’s
punitive damage jurisprudence as trumping state constitutional
restrictions on the jurisdiction of appellate courts.192 In Texas, the
state constitution prohibits the Texas Supreme Court from ruling on
questions of fact; it requires that “[t]he decision of [the courts of
appeals] shall be conclusive on all questions of fact brought before
them on appeal or error.”193 The Texas Supreme Court had interpreted
the provision to limit that court’s review of the excessiveness of trial
court judgments; while the intermediate courts were free to suggest a
remittitur, the Texas Supreme Court could not do so.194 Thus, on
questions of excessiveness, the intermediate courts of appeals would
have the last word under the state constitution.195 Nevertheless, the
Texas Supreme Court adopted the requirement that it conduct a de
novo review of punitive damages.196 It noted that “the Supreme Court
of the United States has found unconstitutional a state constitutional
provision limiting appellate scrutiny of exemplary damages to noevidence review” and concluded that “[o]nly by adhering to [its]
practice of reviewing exemplary damages for constitutional (rather
than factual) excessiveness [could it] avoid a similar constitutional
conflict.”197 Again, however, if constitutional due process does not

189. Id. (quoting Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 436).
190. Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 436.
191. See supra Part I (explaining the benefits of appellate review).
192. Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 307 (Tex. 2006).
193. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6.
194. Alamo Nat’l Bank v. Kraus, 616 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. 1981); TEX. R. APP. P.
46.3.
195. R. Jack Ayres, Jr., Judicial Nullification of the Right to Trial by Jury by
“Evolving” Standards of Appellate Review, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 337, 413 (2008).
196. Tony Gullo Motors, 212 S.W.3d at 307 n.30.
197. Id. at 307. It is also difficult to separate the “constitutional” part of the analysis
from the “factual” part. See, e.g., Sandra Sperino, Judicial Preemption of Punitive
Damages, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 227, 231 (2009) (“[I]n many cases lower courts simply
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require an appeal at all, it is hard to imagine that it requires a state
court to adopt a heightened level of review that it would not otherwise
apply—especially when that review would conflict with a state
constitutional provision.
Finally, punitive damages are not the only area in which the
Supreme Court’s constitutional doctrine conflicts with the denial of
appellate review. The Court has also required heightened appellate
review of actual malice in libel cases, holding that the normal “clearly
erroneous” standard would not apply on appeal, but that instead
“[a]ppellate judges in such a case must exercise independent
judgment and determine whether the record establishes actual malice
with convincing clarity.”198 In the libel context, the constitutional
interest being protected was one of speech, not one of due process;
essentially, the Court resolving a conflict between “deference to
factual findings by the trier of fact and an appellate duty to safeguard
First Amendment freedoms.”199 The Court’s rationale for independent
appellate review was again reminiscent of the logic of appellate
review in general; it needed to supervise the lower courts to ensure
that its announced legal principles “have been constitutionally
applied”200 in a consistent manner “in order to preserve the precious
liberties established and ordained by the Constitution.”201 As in the
Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence, its rationale for heightened
review reflects the importance of appellate review in general; without
it, the Court implies, we would not be able to ensure the preservation
of constitutional guarantees.202

claim the mantle of constitutional excessiveness to justify other, nonconstitutional
inquiries, with little or no actual relationship to excessiveness.”).
198. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984); see Brief of
Amicus Curiae of the American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 173, at 10–
12, 2004 WL 692247, at *10–12.
199. Tung Yin, Independent Appellate Review of Knowledge of Falsity in Defamation
and False Statements Cases, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 325, 386 (2010).
200. Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 508.
201. Id. at 485.
202. Other commentators have argued that appeals are integral to the protection of
substantive constitutional rights. See Arkin, supra note 8, at 557 (“[S]o much of
constitutional criminal law is woven around the availability of an appeal to effectuate
explicit constitutional guarantees that appeals are constitutionally necessary whenever any
explicit constitutional right is implicated.”); Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment “Due
Process,” 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 551 (1970) (“The first amendment due process cases
have shown that first amendment rights are fragile and can be destroyed by insensitive
procedures; in order to completely fulfill the promise of those cases, courts must
thoroughly evaluate every aspect of the procedural system which protects those rights.”).
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IV. THE SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION OF PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
Doctrinal consistency requires a right to appeal at least criminal
convictions, punitive damages awards, and libel judgments. But what
about other areas of the law? This Part explores how the modern
American justice system has developed in a way that weaves a robust
system of appellate remedies into the very fabric of the justice system
as a whole, creating a unified tapestry of procedural safeguards.203 At
the time of the country’s founding, the idea of error correction
through the appellate process was more unusual; the function of
“[l]aw declaration” was written into the Constitution with the creation
of the Supreme Court, but the concept of “law application” through
appeal developed only later with the creation of the intermediate
appellate courts.204
As a matter of practice, appeals have grown in prevalence and
have become part of the legal culture.205 At the same time, however,
the procedural safeguards of an earlier era have diminished: civil jury
trials are far less common today; class actions and other types of
high-stakes litigation have increased, summary judgment has grown,
and civil pleading requirements are in flux.206 These procedures
developed in an era of robust appellate remedies, and they have
created a situation in which the relationship between the trial and
appeal are rightfully considered to exist in a symbiotic relationship.207
A.

Procedural Changes

The shifting procedural landscape demonstrates how the
importance of appellate review extends beyond individual satisfaction
203. On the importance of cross-doctrinal and transsubstantive consistency, see, for
example, Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American
Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109, 111 (2009) (“[T]here is widespread understanding that in
a system that seeks to allocate prospective lawmaking responsibility categorically overt
departures from transsubstantivity would raise questions of institutional power and
legitimacy.”); Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 55,
79 (2008) (“Doctrinal consistency looks at the particular provision and its doctrinal
equivalents, such as the statutes of limitations. Cross-doctrinal consistency, on the other
hand, looks at how doctrinally analogous provisions have been treated.”).
204. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 239
(1985) (“Law declaration, not law application, is the appellate courts’ only constitutionally
mandated duty.”); Steinman, supra note 13, at 1618 (noting that the intermediate appellate
courts primarily engage in error correction, whereas the Supreme Court primarily acts to
“pronounce and harmonize” the law).
205. See supra Part I.
206. See John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122
YALE L.J. 522, 524 (2012).
207. Arkin, supra note 8, at 577–78 (arguing that the constitutionalization of criminal
procedure also creates a need for appellate remedies).
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and the private rights included in the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis.
Instead, appellate review sustains civil procedure more broadly. The
availability of appellate review allows trial judges to take a broader
and more managerial role in litigation, while protecting against the
possibility of irreversible harm caused by a single judge’s biased or
otherwise flawed decision making. It is unlikely that we would have
seen some of the recent procedural developments take place in the
absence of robust appellate rights; without the safety valve that
appellate rights provide, the judicial system would have had to rely on
other mechanisms of protecting litigants’ interests—perhaps by
allowing more cases to go all the way through the trial process or by
allowing even fewer cases to proceed as class actions. Unless the
Supreme Court decides to turn back the clock on these procedural
developments, a robust system of appellate remedies is required to
ensure that litigants’ substantive rights can be protected.208
1. The Growth of Complexity
Legal doctrine has grown increasingly complex in both criminal
procedure and in civil litigation. On the criminal side, observers have
noted that “[b]oth state and federal criminal trials are far more
complex proceedings today than they were just before the turn of the
century when McKane v. Durston was decided.”209 This modern
criminal procedure has been called a “jungle of doctrines” that
includes the law of custodial interrogation and Miranda rights,
search-and-seizure practices, the exclusionary rule, and the right to
counsel.210 These doctrines increase the complexity of criminal
prosecutions and thereby “enhance[] the likelihood of trial error at the
trial level and the corresponding need for corrective appellate
process.”211 As a result of the growth in criminal doctrine, cases tend

208. See Leubsdorf, supra note 12, at 613 (“[W]hatever faults today’s procedural
systems may have, no systemic remodeling appears on the horizon.”).
209. Id. at 574; George C. Thomas III, Remapping the Criminal Procedure Universe,
83 VA. L. REV. 1819, 1819 (1997) (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION
AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997)) (“[T]he law of criminal procedure
had become encrusted with doctrinal complexities that seemed to bear little or no
relationship to the underlying constitutional rights.”).
210. Leubsdorf, supra note 12, at 600.
211. Arkin, supra note 8, at 576. See generally Thomas, supra note 209 (noting these
various complexities in constitutional criminal procedure). This complexity is
compounded in cases involving technology; thus, for example, search-and-seizure doctrine
must accommodate technological developments that “enable an increasing array of
searches that, while not necessarily physically intrusive, have the potential to wholly
eviscerate an individual’s privacy.” Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the
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to be “increasingly front-loaded such that the trial is no longer the
main event.”212 Instead, pretrial procedure and plea bargains play a
larger role.213
On the civil side, courts today are facing a greater number of
complex, high-value, high-stakes lawsuits.214 Economic development
and the migration of corporate headquarters led to greater complexity
in commercial litigation across the nation; likewise, patent, antitrust,
civil rights, and environmental cases also added complexity in civil
litigation and increased the length of trial proceedings.215 Class
actions and other forms of aggregate litigation have also increased
dramatically.216 As complexity and value increased, so too did risk;
such large-scale litigation created a risk—and sometimes a reality—
of bankruptcy, even for large corporate defendants.217
2. The Vanishing Jury Trial and the Rise of the Managerial Judge
Due in part to the growth of complexity, modern litigation has
seen a shift of power from the jury to the trial judge. Historically,
expanded jury rights protected against the risks inherent in having a
single decision maker.218 When the Seventh Amendment guarantee
Fourth Amendment: Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV.
1, 40 (2011).
212. Justin F. Marceau, Embracing a New Era of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 14
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1161, 1162 (2012).
213. Id. at 1162 n.6.
214. Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 531, 536 (1994) (“Recent decades have shown, however, an increase in
the volume, complexity, length, and cost of high-stakes litigation, especially in the federal
courts.”).
215. See Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary
System, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 30 n.115 (1992).
216. See Judith Resnik, Compared to What?: ALI Aggregation and the Shifting
Contours of Due Process and of Lawyers’ Powers, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628, 657
(2011) (“Through new procedures, mechanisms, and doctrines, the possible meanings of
the word ‘case’ changed—such that tens of thousands of people came to be understood as
somehow together . . . in something called a ‘litigation’ that can result, on occasion, in
institutional reform or in millions of dollars distributed to thousands of individuals as
compensation for injuries.”).
217. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 729 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); Alan
N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort
Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2045, 2045 (2000) (“The high costs of litigation threaten
both adequate compensation for the vast number of victims and the survival of the
defendant’s business.”); Resnik, supra note 216, at 659 (“Some of the asbestos
manufacturers had gone into bankruptcy, and their tort claimants trailed along, forcing
group-based handling of mass torts.”).
218. But see Jason M. Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61 EMORY L.J.
1331, 1370 (2012) (noting that although others have argued that the jury offers the
“ ‘many-minds’ benefits of information aggregation and deliberation,” these potential
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was adopted in 1791, proponents expected the civil jury to “protect
private parties against the application of unjust laws, overreaching by
the government when it appears as a litigant, and biased federal
judges.”219 The jury trial functioned, at least to some degree, in just
this manner; civil juries in the early years of the Republic “nullified”
debt-collection actions by British loyalists and abolitionist juries
refused to apply civil remedies in cases involving slavery.220 By the
end of the nineteenth century, however, “the American tradition of
law-finding by jurors” had given way to a more limited role for the
jury as fact-finder, reserving pure question of law for the judge
alone.221
At the same time as the jury’s power decreased in civil cases, the
managerial power of the judge increased.222 Judges took a greater role
in “speeding the resolution of cases and for persuading litigants to
settle rather than try cases whenever possible”; judges also took on
new roles as “mediators, negotiators, and planners” in an effort to
efficiently manage a growing docket.223 On the criminal side, reliance
on plea bargains has grown dramatically and in turn reduced the
power of the jury.224 At the trial court level, therefore, the power of
the judge grew, while the litigants were left “with fewer procedural
safeguards to protect them from abuse of that authority.”225
In both civil and criminal litigation, the pretrial phase (where the
judge is preeminent) has grown to overshadow the trial phase and
therefore “inevitably undermined” the jury even further by reducing
the number of trials.226 In 1936, 20% of civil cases filed went to trial;
by 2002, 1.2% of federal cases went to trial before a jury, and only
0.6% of state cases did so.227 In criminal cases, the rise of plea
bargaining means that only 4% of federal prosecutions and 1.2% of
benefits “are not likely to support a claim of epistemic superiority given the way the jury
actually functions”).
219. Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1627 (2001).
220. Id. at 1628.
221. Id. at 1631 (noting that the United States Supreme Court, in Chicago Rock Island
& Pacific Railway Co. v. Cole, 251 U.S. 54, 56 (1919), “rejected a federal due process
challenge to [an Oklahoma] constitutional provision that preserved a law-finding function
for civil juries on certain issues in tort litigation”).
222. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 379 (1982).
223. Id.
224. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (“[T]he reality [is] that criminal
justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials. Ninety-seven
percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of
guilty pleas.”).
225. Resnik, supra note 222, at 380.
226. Langbein, supra note 206, at 571.
227. Id. at 524.
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state prosecutions now get to a jury.228 As with criminal practice,
pretrial activity has overshadowed trial procedure; now, as Professor
Langbein has stated, “[T]he pretrial becomes the nontrial.”229
3. Summary Judgment Practice and Pleading Standards
Going along with the decline in jury trials and the rise of the
managerial judge, summary disposition devices in civil litigation have
also increased markedly in some categories of civil litigation.230
Although the precise number of cases dismissed on summary
judgment is disputed,231 it is agreed that the use of summary judgment
has had a tremendous impact in certain civil cases—research has
shown that defendants prevail on summary judgment in nearly twothirds of civil rights and employment discrimination cases.232
Summary procedures give individual judges a great deal of
control over which cases should be allowed to go forward. Summary
judgment, which was made easier by a 1986 trilogy of Supreme Court
cases, allows cases to be resolved after the time for discovery has
passed if, in the judge’s view, there are no remaining issues of
material fact to be decided at trial.233 Professor Suja Thomas has
argued that the use of summary judgment unconstitutionally
undermines the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial;234 other
scholars, disagreeing that summary judgment is unconstitutional,
nevertheless agree that it reduces the jury’s power.235

228. Id. at 562.
229. Id. at 542.
230. Id. at 568.
231. Id. at 566.
232. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice:
The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA.
L. REV. 517, 549 (2010).
233. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242–43 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 574–75 (1986); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double
Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (2010) (“The three
decisions in one term sent a clear signal to the legal profession that Rule 56 provides a
useful mechanism for disposing of cases short of trial when the district judge feels the
plaintiff’s case is not plausible. Many courts responded to this invitation with considerable
receptivity.”).
234. Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV.
139, 139–40 (2007).
235. See Edward Brunet, Summary Judgment Is Constitutional, 93 IOWA L. REV.
1625, 1651 (2008) (arguing that modern procedural devices “reduced the power of the jury
without substantially damaging the institution of the jury itself”); William E. Nelson,
Summary Judgment and the Progressive Constitution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1653, 1660 (2008)
(“The American economy on which we rely could not function if today’s juries possessed
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In the last five years, the Supreme Court’s pleading decisions
have gone beyond summary judgment and given a stamp of approval
to the dismissal of civil suits at an even earlier stage in litigation, even
before the parties had engaged in the discovery process.236 In Bell
Atlantic Co. v. Twombly,237 the Supreme Court required a more
detailed pleading from the plaintiff than had been previously
required.238 Previously, a plaintiff could go forward with a case unless
“it appear[ed] beyond doubt [from the plaintiff’s complaint] that the
plaintiff [could] prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.”239 After Twombly, however, the plaintiff
was required to make a showing of “plausibility”; in the antitrust
context in which Twombly arose, the Court held that plausibility
would mean “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an
[anticompetitive] agreement was made.”240 The Court then extended
the plausibility requirement outside of the antitrust context in Ashcroft
v. Iqbal241 to require judges to “draw on . . . judicial experience and
common sense” in “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief.”242
Professor Arthur Miller has suggested that use of these
mechanisms has created a “new model of civil procedure.”243 In the
past, “jurors once were trusted with deciding issues of fact and
applying their findings to the applicable principles of law following
the presentation of evidence,” but now, after Twombly and Iqbal,
“judges are authorized to make these determinations using nothing
but a naked complaint and their own discretion.”244 The new standards
increase the judge’s power even beyond the increase already
experienced with the rise of managerial judging; part of the Court’s
justification for Twombly’s stricter pleading standards was a concern
that in the antitrust class action, the high cost of litigation “will push
cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching
those proceedings [summary judgment or trial].”245 Even “careful case
the broad powers of classic, eighteenth-century juries and the accompanying capacity to
hamper investment and trade.”).
236. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680–84 (2009); Bell Atl. Co. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
237. 550 U.S. 544.
238. Id. at 555.
239. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
240. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
241. 556 U.S. 662.
242. Id. at 679.
243. Miller, supra note 233, at 34.
244. Id.
245. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559.
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management” could not offset the risk of cost-driven injustice, “given
the common lament that the success of judicial supervision in
checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side.”246 This
growth in judicial power has increased the number of cases dismissed
before trial.247
4. Money, Politics, and Judicial Selection
At the same time that individual trial judges have been growing
ever more powerful, the increasing influence of money and politics—
and the growing awareness of individual biases—have led to a
recognition of the need for checks and balances within the judiciary.
Most state judges are elected, not appointed.248 Although state-court
judicial elections have been common since the 1850s, these races
have become significantly more political and more costly in recent
years.249 In the past, running for judge meant placing “a few yard
signs and [making] perfunctory remarks to civic or professional
groups”; today, it often means raising more than a million dollars and
campaigning over highly contested partisan political issues.250
It is not surprising that individual judges are less trusted than
they were in past eras.251 First, the visibility of outside interests in
choosing judges reduces the public’s trust in the judiciary.252 This lack
of trust is compounded when judges themselves demonstrate bias or
corruption. Sometimes the bias may be unconscious; judges are, after
246. Id.
247. See Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to
Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 41 (2010) (“[T]he
summary judgment motion and the motion to dismiss may have similar effects, including
the significant use of the procedures by courts, a related increased role of judges in
litigation, and a corresponding increased dismissal of employment discrimination cases.”).
248. Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 289, 335 (2011); David E. Posen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 265, 266 (2008) (noting that “the majority of U.S. states have subjected
at least some of their courts to popular elections; roughly ninety percent of state general
jurisdiction judges are currently selected or retained this way”).
249. Thomas R. Phillips, Time Has Come to Reform Judicial Selection System,
HOUSTON LAW., Mar./Apr. 2003, at 10, 10.
250. See Thomas R. Phillips, When Money Talks, the Judiciary Must Balk, WASH.
POST, Apr. 14, 2002, at B.02 (noting changes in judicial elections resulting from increased
donations to candidates).
251. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 44
(2003) (“There seems to be a general consensus that court-directed hostility has been on
the upswing in recent years, with any number of manifestations.”).
252. Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973, 995
(2001) (“The public perception is that judges are influenced by campaign
contributions . . . . Perception in this instance is as important as reality. If voters believe
that donors call the tune, . . . confidence in the judicial system will be eroded.”).
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all, subject to the same cognitive biases as anyone else.253 In other
cases, however, there may be straightforward criminal corruption, as
there was in Pennsylvania’s “Cash for Kids” scandal, in which
“judges are believed to have accumulated between $2.6 and $2.8
million in kickbacks from two different private detention facilities”
for ordering juveniles to be sent to those facilities.254 Finally, the same
political pressures are also present when elected officials in the
executive branch review judicial outcomes. Because of these political
pressures, executive clemency in criminal cases has become
exceedingly rare in the modern era—even though, unlike the
appellate process, it is a remedy specifically mentioned in the U.S.
Constitution.255
The existence of appellate review serves as a check on both the
perception and the reality of biased or corrupt judging. As others have
stated, “[W]hat is involved in appellate review is, at bottom, simply
confidence or lack thereof in another person’s decision.”256 Reviewing
the judge’s decision through the appellate process provides a check
on potential abuse of power and thereby restores confidence. Lack of
confidence in a single individual is also minimized by selecting a
larger panel of decision makers; in the United States, appellate panels
typically comprise at least three judges.257
This “rule of three” has often been expressed in terms of “three
heads . . . being better than one,” though often with little
explanation.258 Professor Chad Oldfather has expanded on the “three
253. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the
Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 43 (2007) (“[J]udges, like
everyone else, have two cognitive systems for making judgments—the intuitive and the
deliberative—and the intuitive system appears to have a powerful effect on judges’
decision making.”).
254. Sarah L. Primrose, When Canaries Won’t Sing: The Failure of the Attorney SelfReporting System in the “Cash-for-Kids” Scheme, 36 J. LEGAL PROF. 139, 146 (2011).
255. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon
Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1169, 1212 (2010).
256. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 113–14 (2008).
257. Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 82 (2003) (“[T]he statutory authority for
courts of appeals to sit in panels . . . requires the inclusion of at least three judges in the
first instance.”); Samuel P. Jordan, Irregular Panels, 60 ALA. L. REV. 547, 582 (2009)
(“[A]ll circuits but one permit a panel of two judges to decide the merits of an appeal in
certain circumstances . . . . Generally, a third judge must be assigned to replace an
unavailable judge if the two remaining judges do not agree, and may be assigned if the two
remaining judges agree but decline to exercise their discretion to decide the case by
quorum.”).
258. William W. Schwarzer, Defining Standards of Review, in THE FEDERAL
APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 100, 101–02 (Cynthia Harrison
& Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1989) (“The appellate court’s claim to superior judgment . . .
lies in numbers, three heads usually being better than one.”).
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heads are better than one” concept by breaking it down into two
specific benefits.259 First, there is the advantage of deliberation, in
which “the need to secure two votes in order to form a majority
requires the judges to exchange viewpoints and information regarding
the issues presented, and, perhaps more significantly, requires them to
take the viewpoint of at least one other person into serious
consideration.”260 Second, there is the advantage of probability—the
idea that having more people answers a particular question can
increase the probability of reaching a correct answer, even when their
conclusions are independent of each other.261 The probability
advantage has also been termed the “wisdom of crowds”; research has
repeatedly shown that aggregating a number of flawed individual
judgments can provide a significantly more reliable result.262 Finally,
multi-judge panels can reduce bias and arbitrary decision making, as
the panel can benefit “not merely by the presence of more than one
mind but also by the presence of more than one vantage point.”263
B.

The Distributive Power of Appellate Review

Modern procedural changes at the trial court level tell a story of
the growing power of trial judges in the face of diminishing power of
traditional procedural safeguards. Jury trials are diminishing; trial
judges are taking an increasingly influential role in managing both the
process of how legal claims are handled as well as substance-based
decisions about whether cases should be allowed to go forward at
all.264 The stakes have never been higher for the litigants, as cases
grow in value and complexity; confidence in individual judges,
however, is not always high, as money and politics take a toll on
public trust.265
The existence of a guaranteed right of appellate review can
redistribute the effects of these procedures on due process. The jury
trial once ensured that decisions would not be made by a single
decisionmaker; now, the rise of appellate review by a multi-judge
259. Chad M. Oldfather, Universal De Novo Review, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 328
(2009).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS, at xiv (2004) (“[D]espite all
these limitations, when our imperfect judgments are aggregated in the right way, our
collective intelligence is often excellent.”).
263. Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias
and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1201, 1209 (1992).
264. See supra Part IV.A.2–3.
265. See supra Part IV.A.1, 4.
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panel plays that role. Appellate court supervision also cabins in the
managerial power of the trial judge. In some cases, the appellate court
might be needed to reverse an abuse of discretion; in other cases,
however, the mere availability of appellate review can deter a trial
judge from abusing that power in the first instance.266 Appellate
review is also necessary to ensure that viable claims are not
eliminated at the pleading stage or by summary judgment procedures.
This review is especially valuable to plaintiffs, who might otherwise
find that an overworked trial judge’s view of the merits is
unconsciously influenced by concerns for docket control.267
The modern increase in large-scale litigation magnifies the
redistributive due process effect of appellate procedure. Regardless of
whether this increase in high-stakes litigation is a good thing or a bad
thing, such complex litigation could not have developed without a
robust system of appellate review. When a negative outcome could
bankrupt a party, a reliable outlet for error correction is essential. This
effect can be seen when parties choose litigation over arbitration in
some high-stakes cases; though arbitration might otherwise limit the
cost of dispute resolution, the elimination of appellate remedy may
simply be too great a risk to bear.268
In large-stakes and complex cases generally, the question may be
“not about whether to appeal, but when.”269 In these cases, the cost of
266. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies,
and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 947 (1988) (“Appellate review can provide an
effective check against politically influenced adjudication, arbitrary and self-interested
decisionmaking, and other evils that the separation of powers was designed to prevent.”);
Resnik, supra note 88, at 607 (stating that appellate review “has the capacity to rectify
disparities and inequities produced in the first tier and to promote consistent norm
enforcement”).
267. Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903, 946 (2002)
(noting “the possibility that the courts are, consciously or unconsciously, utilizing the
heuristics to clear complex cases that would otherwise remain on the dockets for lengthy
periods of time”).
268. See William H. Knull, III & Noah D. Rubins, Betting the Farm on International
Arbitration: Is It Time to Offer an Appeal Option?, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 531, 533
(2000) (“[S]ome possible consumers will choose not to arbitrate because their transactions
are too large to bear the risk of error without adequate means to correct those mistakes,
instead taking their chances in national courts or agreeing to settle on terms that would not
be acceptable if a viable dispute resolution alternative were available.”); Guy S. Lipe &
Timothy J. Tyler, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Creating Room
for Choice in International Cases, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 36–37 (2010) (“[C]ourts and
parties continue to innovate with hybrid procedures that may make litigation less
expensive and thus more attractive to parties who would want the appellate review
desirable for ‘bet the farm’ cases.”).
269. James E. Pfander & David R. Pekarek Krohn, Interlocutory Review by Agreement
of the Parties: A Preliminary Analysis, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1043, 1095 n.219 (2011).
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appealing the trial court’s judgment is likely to be only a small
fraction of the overall litigation cost; the expense and delay of the
appeals process improves accuracy without unduly adding to the
expense of litigation.270 Because appellate remedies play such a
critical role in complex litigation, appellate rights may even be
extended before final judgment; thus, for example, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure were amended to allow interlocutory review of
class-certification decisions, and similar proposals have been made
for multidistrict litigation.271
Within the procedural system, appellate review may therefore
redistribute power in ways that are consistent with constitutional
values. Without appeals, the modern procedural system is at risk of
failing to protect such values; the demise of civil jury trials and the
increase in criminal plea bargaining, for example, have diminished
the power of the jury. Likewise, the complexity of modern litigation
creates risks of legal error that were largely unknown when the Bill of
Rights was adopted.272 These risks are compounded by political
realities that place new pressure on judges at the same time that
judges’ individual power is increasing.273 These procedural realities
require a safety valve that can correct injustice and distribute power
away from the individual judge. It is not surprising, then, that
appellate review has developed to play just this role in modern
practice.
V. THE EXPRESSIVE VALUE OF NONDISCRETIONARY
APPELLATE REVIEW
Previous Sections of this Article discussed the effect of appellate
remedies on litigant outcomes, doctrinal consistency, and systemic
procedure. This Part moves beyond these functions to examine how
constitutionalizing a nondiscretionary right of appeal would express
certain social and legal values that shape both culture and norms.
Unlike the cost-benefit analysis that comes out firmly in favor of
270. Id. at 1060 n.76, 1095 n.219 (noting that pretrial expenses in large-stakes cases
often vastly outweigh appellate costs, and concluding that, given the high value of the
interests at stake in such cases, an appeal is therefore virtually guaranteed regardless of the
outcome at trial).
271. Andrew S. Pollis, The Need for Non-Discretionary Interlocutory Appellate
Review in Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1693–94 (2011)
(“Congress and the Supreme Court have extended mandatory appellate jurisdiction over
several categories of interlocutory orders. The time has come to make another categorical
value judgment, adding certain MDL orders to that list.”).
272. See supra Part IV.A.1.
273. See supra Part IV.A.2–4.
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extending appellate rights, the effect on normative values is more
nuanced: there are significant reasons to protect values on both sides
of the equation.
There is no doubt that procedural choices can both reflect and
shape systemic values. As Professor Judith Resnik has noted,
procedure has a power beyond the outcomes it creates; it can also
“instruct about and . . . act out the political system, . . . legitimate
decisions of the state, . . . dignify the participants, and . . . make
meaningful the interaction between individuals and the state.”274
Some have taken this idea even further, stating that “courts exist to
give meaning to our public values, not to resolve disputes,” and that
“[c]onstitutional adjudication is the most vivid manifestation of this
function.”275 Appellate procedure more specifically has been
described as expressing the background values of fairness,
predictability, efficiency, and respect for the adversarial process.276
Even outside procedure, formalizing rules can alter social norms
and social meaning. Thus, for example, some have suggested that the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 helped give force to the social
meaning of equality by associating the values of nondiscrimination
and respect for the law.277 Within the procedural system, the process
values underlying the American justice system (including, but not
limited to, the values of participatory governance, legitimacy, respect
for individual dignity, certainty and predictability, and finality)
likewise shape societal expectations about what it means to have a
fair judicial process.278 Formalizing procedural requirements through
the constitutionalization of appellate review can therefore give added
force to the values protected by the procedural system.
A.

The Importance of a Nondiscretionary Appellate Right

In order to harness the expressive power of a constitutional rule,
it is important that appellate review be guaranteed to all litigants,
requiring the appellate court to decide the appeal and without granting
274. Resnik, supra note 88, at 619; see also Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter:
Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 305, 337 (2008) (“In addition to
governing human behavior through rules and sanctions, the law conveys social
messages.”).
275. Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29 (1979).
276. Sarah M. R. Cravens, Involved Appellate Judging, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 294
(2004).
277. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2043–44 (1996).
278. Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes—A Plea for
“Process Values”, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 20–27 (1974) (cataloging process values).
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it the authority to voluntarily decline jurisdiction. Some
commentators have argued against such a rule, asserting that a
discretionary certiorari system can provide a sufficient appellate
remedy.279 They have contended that the fact that the parties can
present their arguments to the higher court sufficiently protects
appellate rights even if the court then denies the appeal.280 This
position has pragmatic support, as the discretionary denial of review
has the same outcome as affirming a lower court’s judgment—in both
cases, the original judgment stands unchanged.281
Nevertheless, from a procedural point of view, the discretionary
denial of appellate review is by no means equivalent to an affirmance.
A court with discretionary review power may deny review for any
number of reasons other than the perceived correctness of the lower
court’s ruling. A court may decline review, for example, because the
underlying judgment is small and its effect appears limited to the
parties before the court and unlikely to affect future cases; in these
cases, “mere error in the lower courts is insufficient to warrant
review.”282 Even if the case is important, a court may deny review if
the record is unclear or underdeveloped, if the briefing is of low
quality, or to allow similar cases to develop in the lower courts.283 A
right to nondiscretionary appellate review, on the other hand, requires
the reviewing court to act upon the lower court’s judgment—either
reversing or affirming it, in whole or in part. Much of the power of
nondiscretionary review stems from this universality.
A right to nondiscretionary review also requires the court to give
a reason for its action. Again, therefore, it is necessary to set a
baseline: what is the minimal opinion that preserves the underlying
goal of appellate review? Nearly every scholar who has examined that
question has concluded that, at a minimum, there must be some
explanation of the reason for the court’s decision; to include no
explanation at all for the court’s disposition “effectively converts the
279. See, e.g., Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writs of Certiorari at 14–15, Cent.
W. Va. Energy Co. v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 129 S. Ct. 626 (2008) (Nos. 08217 & 08-218), 2008 WL 4685267, at *14–15.
280. Id.
281. Billotti v. Legursky, 975 F.2d 113, 116 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that because of
administrative limitations, a system of appeals as of right would not provide “a more
meaningful opportunity to be heard than does West Virginia’s system of discretionary
appeals”).
282. Hon. Craig T. Enoch & Michael S. Truesdale, Issues and Petitions: The Impact
on Supreme Court Practice, 31 ST. MARY’S L.J. 565, 605 (2000) (“If an issue fails to
demonstrate an error of jurisprudential significance, but only one affecting the parties to a
case, then perhaps that error is less likely to survive the scrutiny of the petition process.”).
283. Maryland v. Balt. Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 917–19 (1950).
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statutory appeal of right into a denial of a petition for certiorari,” as
“in both cases the decision maker has declined to explain its
decision.”284 The use of non-precedential opinions combined with
rules against citation of those opinions has been more controversial;
some have defended them as a time-saving device that prioritizes the
need for the parties before the court to obtain a relatively speedy
decision by de-prioritizing the interests of others not currently before
the court.285 Others, however, have criticized the practice as
antithetical to the development of the common law by inhibiting the
development of binding legal rules.286 Constitutional arguments have
been made to support both sides of such no-citation rules.287
This Article does not take a side in the particulars of that debate,
but seeks only to identify the minimum rule needed to protect
effective appellate review. In that regard, this Article identifies the
key aspects of a judicial opinion as (1) providing at least a brief
reference to the substantive law or reasoning that drives the

284. William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New
Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 285
(1996) (citing Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of
Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 838 (1991)) (“In our law . . . the exercise
of a power to speak authoritatively as an interpreter carries with it an obligation to explain
the grounds upon which the interpreter gives that authoritative judgment.”); Alvin B.
Rubin, Bureaucratization of the Federal Courts: The Tension Between Justice and
Efficiency, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 648, 655 (1980) (“Every judge should be required to
give his reasons for a decision, and these reasons should be sufficient not only to explain
the result to the litigants but also to enable other litigants to comprehend its precedential
value and the limits to its authority.”). But see Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47
STAN. L. REV. 633, 659 (1995) (“[W]hen context, case-by-case decisionmaking, and
flexibility are thought important, the benefits of requiring decisionmakers to give reasons
do not come without a price.”).
285. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1178 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Deciding a large
portion of our cases in this fashion frees us to spend the requisite time drafting
precedential opinions in the remaining cases. Should courts allow parties to cite to these
dispositions, however, much of the time gained would likely vanish.”); Kenneth Anthony
Laretto, Precedent, Judicial Power, and the Constitutionality of “No-Citation” Rules in
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1037, 1038 (2002) (“[N]o-citation rules
are . . . constitutionally justified as applied to decisions that are objectively nonprecedential.”).
286. See, e.g., Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 898 (8th Cir.), vacated as
moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Daniel N. Hoffman, Publicity and the
Judicial Power, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 343, 353 (2001) (“The freedom of litigants to
call to our attention and to the courts’ attention any precedents and principles they deem
inconsistent with the result advocated by the other side is a necessary condition for having
the confidence we need. Otherwise there is no sufficient check, scrutiny, or
accountability.”).
287. Massanari, 266 F.3d at 1178 (concluding that such rules are constitutionally
permitted); Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 898 (concluding that they are not).
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decision;288 and (2) allowing future citation to that decision for its
persuasive value, even if it is designated as non-precedential.289
Reason-giving ensures a minimum of due process and prohibits the
court from effectively declining to review the underlying judgment.290
And even an opinion designated as non-precedential can fulfill the
error-correction function of appellate review; it still resolves the
dispute in the case at hand.291 Furthermore, since no two cases are
exactly alike, even opinions designated as precedential can generally
be distinguished on the facts.292 Yet, the ability to cite appellate
decisions—whether formally precedential or not—is crucial to the
appellate functions that extend beyond mere error correction:
encouraging the development and refinement of legal principles;
increasing uniformity and standardization in the application of legal
rules; and promoting respect for the rule of law.293 If parties are
precluded from arguing that their case should be resolved similarly—
or differently—from other cases that share similar characteristics,
then appellate courts would not be able to ensure uniform treatment of
288. See Daniel N. Hoffman, supra note 286, at 353 (“How much must we be told to
enable us to understand what the law is, according to which the conflict has been
resolved? ‘Affirmed in light of the precedent, P v. D’ might conceivably suffice. But
‘Affirmed, Rule 51’ cannot suffice, because rule 51, which simply permits summary
dispositions, is not a rule of substantive law. It does not even pretend to explain why this
plaintiff, or those similarly situated, are entitled to prevail. At most, it suggests that the
court has deliberated and, for unknown reasons, has determined that such is the case.”).
289. See Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in
the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1469 (2003) (describing a proposed rule which
would “allow the citation of unpublished opinions solely for persuasive value”); see also
FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 (“A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal judicial
opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been: (i) designated as
‘unpublished,’ . . . and (ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007.”); ROBERT TIMOTHY
REAGAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CITING UNPUBLISHED FEDERAL APPELLATE OPINIONS
ISSUED BEFORE 2007, at 2–4 (2007) (showing variation among courts’ positions on citing
unpublished opinions through a series of tables).
290. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 284, at 285; see also Paul R. Verkuil,
Crosscurrents in Anglo-American Administrative Law, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 685, 703
(1986) (“The statement of reasons ingredient is critical to American due process
jurisprudence . . . . [I]t gives the parties notice of the basis on which their claims are
denied[;] . . . it satisfies the parties and the public that the democratic principle of rational
decisionmaking has been vindicated; and . . . it forces intellectual discipline upon deciding
officials, which enhances the correctness of the initial decision process.”).
291. See, e.g., Massanari, 266 F.3d at 1178 (“An unpublished disposition is, more or
less, a letter from the court to parties familiar with the facts, announcing the result and the
essential rationale of the court’s decision.”).
292. See Shawn J. Bayern, Case Interpretation, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 125, 169
(2008) (“[D]ecisions are stated and then narrowed or expanded as facts test the generality
of those decisions. The law that evolves is bound to—rather than insensitive to—the facts
that give rise to it.”).
293. See supra notes 14–17.
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like cases and would not be able to aid in the development of the
underlying legal principles.
Nondiscretionary review combined with reason-giving therefore
gives expression to values of individualized justice, litigant dignity,
and institutional legitimacy of the judiciary. Nevertheless, there are
also costs to promoting these values within the appellate system.
Nondiscretionary review also enforces a preference for accuracy over
finality, while it diminishes the power of individual states—especially
of the political branches of government within those states—to
exercise policy choices in funding the judiciary.
B.

Institutional Legitimacy and Individual Dignity

Discretionary review focuses primarily on systemic values and
permits the Supreme Court to exercise what Professor Ratner has
termed the two “essential appellate functions under the
Constitution”—to resolve conflicts among lower courts and to
maintain the supremacy of federal law.294 Nondiscretionary review,
however, promotes error correction in a wider variety of cases; it is
largely the purview of intermediate appellate courts, whose very
creation was left to the will of Congress.295 The appellate judicial role
in error correction is essential to a functioning system—and it is a
role that is not replicated in any other branch of government.296
Because nondiscretionary review better ensures error correction
in individual cases, it also better comports with popular conceptions
of justice and due process. Litigants routinely expect to have a right to
appeal, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s statements that no such
right exists under the U.S. Constitution.297 The idea of justice on
appeal is firmly established in popular culture:

294. Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 161 (1960).
295. See id.
296. See Paul D. Carrington, A Critical Assessment of the Cultural and Institutional
Roles of Appellate Courts, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 231, 235 (2007) (“Yes, of course,
appellate courts make law. But we do have other institutions to provide that service. The
indispensable task of the appellate court is to correct error, or perhaps more precisely, to
convince the parties and their counsel that the possibility of incorrect application of the
law has been seriously considered by judges of rank and security, and to remind trial
judges that they are indeed confined by the law in the choices that they may make in
response to overtures from parties.”).
297. Arkin, supra note 8, at 504 (“[M]ost people—if not most law school graduates—
simply assume that the constitutional guarantee of due process of law includes some right
to appeal a criminal conviction.”).
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Like Miranda warnings, the expectation of appellate review
following a trial court conviction is deeply embedded in our
national consciousness, as exemplified by fictional and filmic
protagonists who cry out at the jury’s verdict, “I’ll appeal!” or
who languish—perhaps temporarily—in prison while their
destiny is in the hands of an appellate court. It would surprise
many Americans to learn that there is, in fact, no right to such
review as there is a right to trial by jury and a right not to
incriminate oneself. By this admittedly imperfect measure of
“national culture,” the right of appeal deserves a loftier stature
than it now enjoys.298
It is likely that the pervasive statutory right to appeal has allowed
the concept of appellate justice to permeate through the national
culture. In a sense, then, constitutionalizing the right to an appeal
would simply reflect the status quo that many people believe already
exists.299 If the public were aware that such appellate rights were in
fact not guaranteed—and that such rights are not available in every
state at the present time, and could be taken away by other cashstrapped state legislatures at a future time—then the justice system
could well face a crisis of legitimacy.300 As other scholars have noted,
the value of the appellate system’s ability to increase public trust in
judicial outcomes may exceed the amount of error correction actually
accomplished.301
This institutional legitimacy value also overlaps with the values
of individual dignity and participation in the justice system. Again,
the instrumental importance of error correction may be subsidiary to
the process values of participation, dignity, and trust: even when
litigants lose their appeal on the merits, empirical research has shown
that the mere fact of being heard promotes a sense of procedural
fairness and leaves people feeling better about the outcome.302 A right
of appeal allows litigants “to present the evidence and the arguments
they consider essential to protect their rights.”303 When litigants
appeal an adverse verdict, one goal is to reverse that outcome—but
298. Cavallaro, supra note 50, at 985–86.
299. See id. (noting that litigants expect a right of appeal); see also supra notes 1–2
(noting similar popular perceptions).
300. See Cavallaro, supra note 50, at 980.
301. Id. at 981; Dalton, supra note 12, at 98.
302. See SCOTT BARCLAY, AN APPEALING ACT: WHY PEOPLE APPEAL IN CIVIL
CASES 12, 101–12 (1999) (analyzing the result of an empirical study of why people
choose to appeal, and finding that litigants appeal because they seek “to be heard fairly,”
and concluding that a fair hearing may meet their appellate goals “even if the subsequent
outcome is negative”).
303. Leubsdorf, supra note 12, at 593.
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another goal is “to be heard fairly by someone in authority in regard
to the issue that the litigants think is at the heart of their dispute.”304
The Supreme Court has, in the past, recognized that “a purpose of
procedural due process is to convey to the individual a feeling that the
government has dealt with him fairly, as well as to minimize the risk
of mistaken deprivations of protected interests.”305
Professor Dalton’s explanation of the appellate process may shed
light on the mechanism of how even a loss on appeal can improve
trust in judicial procedure. In his view, the state’s power over
individuals in the judicial process is so great, that before it acts on
that power, “the state must satisfy itself several times over that such a
judgment is warranted”; likewise, “before depriving an individual of
liberty the state must act in a way that evidences and reaffirms respect
for that liberty, lest we all be cheapened, diminished, and rendered
more vulnerable.”306 The appellate system promotes participation by
allowing losing litigants to seek a second chance at justice by
presenting their concerns to a higher tribunal.307 Even if they do not
prevail on appeal, a ruling on the substance of their claim by a second
tribunal gives losing litigants a greater voice in the justice system; it
reassures litigants “that they are getting the personal attention of
judges that is the heart of the Due Process guaranteed by state and
federal constitutions.”308
In this regard, the trial system and appellate system protect
different litigant interests: at the trial court, the litigant’s dispute is
with the opposing party, and at the appellate level the litigant’s
dispute is with the state. Due process at the trial level protects the
litigant’s right to complain about—or to defend against—the
opposing party’s actions. On appeal, however, the complaint is not
that the opposing party acted wrongfully, but rather than the trial
court below acted wrongfully in its handling of the underlying
dispute. Due process at the trial level can at most give the litigant a
sense of being heard in the dispute with the opposing party; by
304. Id.
305. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 262 (1978); see also Douglas Laycock, Due
Process and Separation of Powers: The Effort to Make the Due Process Clause
Nonjusticiable, 60 TEX. L. REV. 875, 887 (1982) (“The sense of unfair treatment felt by
victims of inadequate procedure is precisely the sort of individual harm that constitutional
rights and judicial review are meant to protect against.”).
306. Dalton, supra note 12, at 102.
307. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 321 (2004)
(“Procedure without participation may command obedience, but it cannot win principled
allegiance.”).
308. Carrington, supra note 296, at 236.
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definition, it cannot give the litigant a sense of being heard with
regard to the court’s action. Because it is the trial court that ultimately
takes action by imposing (or failing to impose) civil damages or
criminal penalties, the litigant who seeks to appeal will have a
complaint about the trial court’s action that is separate and distinct
from any complaint against the opposing party. Thus, although the
denial of a discretionary appeal may ultimately have the same
outcome as an affirmance on the merits (both actions would leave the
trial court’s action undisturbed), the discretionary denial of review
does not provide the same sense of being heard—it does not
“demonstrate to the world that someone [backed by the state’s
authority] has heard and understood the substance of the appellant’s
contention.”309 As a result, the discretionary review in a certiorari
system may work quite well as a second-level layer of protection, but
it does not ensure “adequate and effective review” of the trial court’s
action, and it is therefore no substitute for a first-level appeal as of
right.310
Finally, a nondiscretionary right to appeal also protects a
litigant’s dignity by diffusing the power of an individual judge—a
diffusion that is especially important in an era where the power of the
trial judge is larger than ever before.311 With a right to appeal, a single
person is no longer in control of the litigant’s destiny; instead, the
power of the state must be exercised through a multi-judge appellate
panel in addition to the trial court. In this way, “[d]ecentralized
decisionmaking limits the amount of power vested in a single
individual[, and] . . . the coercion of the state is legitimated by the
limitations on concentrations of power.”312 The appellate process
thereby ensures not just that the litigant will have a voice in the
process, but that the litigant will lose only if a larger number of voices
join together in that decision. Thus, win or lose, a right to appeal
gives individuals a voice in the justice system, endorses the ideals of

309. Paul D. Carrington, Justice on Appeal in Criminal Cases: A Twentieth-Century
Perspective, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 459, 472 (2009).
310. Peter D. Marshall, A Comparative Analysis of the Right to Appeal, 22 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 45 (2011) (noting that different countries provide different types of
appellate review in criminal cases, but arguing that “[w]hile the exact form that an appeal
takes may vary, all appeals must afford a convicted person the ability to access an
adequate and effective review of conviction and sentence”).
311. See supra Part IV.
312. Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 851 (1984).
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human dignity and collective decision making, and reflects a deeply
held cultural expectation.313
C.

Finality, Federalism, and the Political Process

Appellate review necessarily creates a tension between the
values of finality and accuracy. The value of accuracy is at the heart
of appellate review, and underlies both the error-correction function
of review and the public-trust function.314 The existence of
compelling inaccuracies that are incapable of correction stokes
distrust of the justice system generally; this effect is highly visible
both in the number of “innocence projects” around the country that
seek to free the wrongly convicted and the call for constitutional
protection of actual innocence claims.315
In almost every case, however, the value of accuracy will
eventually give way to a need for finality, as evidenced by the
universal existence of appellate deadlines.316 The value of finality is
not just a matter of efficiency: it is also “an expression of a desire to

313. See Lena Husani Hughes, Time Waits for No Man—But Is Tolled for Certain
Post-Judgment Motions: Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4) and the Fate of
Withdrawn Post-Judgment Motions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 357–58 (2012) (“[T]he
right of appeal remains, for many, an important indication that the justice system values
accuracy in its decisions and promotes fair treatment of litigants who participate in the
system.”); see also Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in
the Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 177 (2011) (“The legitimacy of our legal
system is premised on its constitutional roots, which guarantee due process of law. But in
practice, the subjective assessments about the quality of justice received will also
influence participants’ perceptions about legitimacy—in particular, the quality of
procedural justice received.”).
314. See supra Part I.
315. See, e.g., Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93
MARQ. L. REV. 591, 637 (2009) (“The empirical record shows that the American system
for appealing criminal convictions regularly fails in its most important role of protecting
against erroneous conviction of the innocent.”); Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence
Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 160 (1970)
(“I would also allow an exception to the concept of finality where a convicted defendant
makes a colorable showing that an error, whether ‘constitutional’ or not, may be producing
the continued punishment of an innocent man.”); Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence,
92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1699 (2007) (“The lack of a capstone innocence claim under the
Federal Constitution has resulted in a conflicted regime.”).
316. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, When Is Finality . . . Final? Rehearing and
Resurrection in the Supreme Court, 12 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 2 (2011) (“A case that
is still on appeal is not yet final in this sense, and so an appellate court can reverse a trial
court decision that was perfectly correct when rendered but that has become incorrect by
the time of the appeal. After finality attaches, however, the judgment stands even if the
law later changes.” (footnote omitted)); Catherine T. Struve, Time and the Courts: What
Deadlines and Their Treatment Tell Us About the Litigation System, 59 DEPAUL L. REV.
601, 622–23 (2009) (describing the strict nature of post-judgment motion deadlines).
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limit the time between the eruption of a dispute, its resolution, and the
implementation of a solution[;] . . . a view that fluidity, flexibility,
and open-endedness work injustice, lead to instability, and undermine
the rule of law.”317 Without finality, “[t]here comes a point where a
procedural system which leaves matters perpetually open no longer
reflects humane concern but merely anxiety and a desire for
immobility.”318
In an individual case, it can be difficult enough to draw a line
between the competing values of accuracy and finality. When the
question of individual justice is compelling enough, even a reasonable
deadline will give way in the need for “fundamental fairness”; thus,
for example, when a man on death row was effectively abandoned
after his attorneys left their law firm, the Supreme Court was willing
to waive the appeal deadlines.319 Even with the compelling facts of
this case—the life-or-death consequence, the lack of counsel, and the
lack of an opportunity to present an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim on direct appeal—the Supreme Court divided seven to two
about whether the value of accuracy or the value of finality would
control the outcome.320
The balance between accuracy and finality within a system of
nondiscretionary review becomes even more difficult to assess when
federalism concerns are thrown into the mix.321 States must make
political choices about the resources they are able to allocate to their
judicial systems, and this means making a choice about when to focus
those resources away from correcting inaccurate judgments and
317. Resnik, supra note 312, at 851–52.
318. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 452–53 (1963).
319. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 927 (2012).
320. Id. at 927 (acknowledging the values of comity and finality, but concluding that
“fundamental fairness [remains] the central concern of the writ of habeas corpus”); id. at
929 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that federal habeas corpus review undermines the
states’ “practical interest in the finality of their criminal judgments”).
321. Cases that fit within the Supreme Court’s exclusive original jurisdiction are an
interesting example of this balance; by their nature, these cases necessarily escape
appellate review. However, these are also the types of cases where finality is most
urgently needed. See, e.g., Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 504 (1893) (noting that
the Court has original jurisdiction in boundary disputes between states, “which otherwise
might be the fruitful cause of prolonged and harassing conflicts”); see also Anne-Marie C.
Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial Process: Special Masters in the Supreme
Court’s Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV. 625, 632–33 (2001) (explaining
the Supreme Court’s original—and exclusive—jurisdiction in interstate disputes and
noting that this “exclusive nature of the Court’s original jurisdiction thus requires the
Court to function in all respects as a trial court, or a court of first instance, in cases
between state opponents”).
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“toward more productive ends.”322 If fundamental due process is
interpreted to require a nondiscretionary right of appeal, then state
freedom to make a political choice about whether to offer an appeal is
limited. Thus, for example, a state such as Virginia may have a policy
that emphasizes the supervisory role of the appellate system over the
error-correction function; by relying on a system of discretionary
appeals, appellate courts are able to focus their resources on the cases
that raise questions that are important to the jurisprudence of the state.
Creating a nondiscretionary review requirement would turn the
appellate judiciary into courts of error correction and would thereby
limit the state’s ability to channel its judicial resources as it sees fit.
Adopting a constitutional requirement for appeals that overrides
state political processes is problematic: the political process most
clearly represents the public’s policy choices, and it remains flexible
to changing conditions.323 As some have pointed out, “The legislature
creates substantive rights; why should it not decide how vigorously it
wants to enforce those rights and what procedures will suffice?”324
Justice Brandeis famously noted that the states can serve as
laboratories of democracy, and can “try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country”;325 why not allow
states to decide for themselves whether to offer a nondiscretionary
right of appeal?
Constitutionalizing a right to appeal is therefore not without cost:
it enforces a preference for accuracy over finality, and it does so at
the cost of individual states’ policy choices. In one sense, this may be
the case with any constitutional protection. As Alexander Bickel
noted half a century ago—and as many academic commentators have
explored in the interim—some of the Court’s most important work is
explicitly
countermajoritarian,
protecting
the
politically
326
disempowered against majority rule. Of course, on a national level
322. Bator, supra note 318, at 453.
323. See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1, 58 (2004) (“Public participation seems easier in state and local politics; this may be so
because the issues seem more immediate, because citizens are more likely to know state or
local politicians personally, or because the barriers to entry into politics are lower at the
state and local level.”).
324. Leubsdorf, supra note 12, at 593.
325. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
326. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16–17 (1962); see
also Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002) (“For decades,
legal academics have struggled with the ‘countermajoritarian difficulty’: the problem of
justifying the exercise of judicial review by unelected and ostensibly unaccountable judges
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the right to appeal is not countermajoritarian; almost every
jurisdiction chooses to provide appeals as of right.327 But in the
individual states that do not currently offer such rights, the
constitutionalization of a right to appeal would have a
countermajoritarian effect and would create “interference with state
autonomy.”328
Thus, constitutionalizing the right to appeal requires making a
choice between several competing values, and it comes at a cost both
to the political branches of government and to state autonomy. Is it
worth it? Although it is a close call, there are systemic reasons to
believe that the protection of individual rights through the appellate
process can outweigh the importance of deference to state political
choices. As Professor Leubsdorf has argued, “[C]ourts should not
leave questions of access and participation to the political process, for
access and participation constitute an integral part of the democratic
system that legitimizes that process.”329
Current research into the juvenile justice system illustrates the
importance of appellate review in protecting the access and
participation rights of the politically disempowered, suggesting that
appellate remedies tend to be underutilitized in the juvenile justice
system.330 Across the United States, juveniles who are adjudicated
delinquent (the juvenile equivalent of a criminal conviction) appeal in
only five out of every one thousand cases.331 Rates vary significantly
from state to state, but do not seem to correlate with the level of state
protection: instead, appeals are more common when system
in what we otherwise deem to be a political democracy.”); Corinna Barrett Lain, The
Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards,” 57 UCLA L. REV. 365, 417 (2009) (“The
whole point of having an unelected judiciary is its ability to serve as a check on majority
rule, which is why the Supreme Court’s countermajoritarian capacity undergirds most
every normative theory of judicial review.”).
327. Lain, supra note 326, at 418.
328. Id.
329. Leubsdorf, supra note 12, at 598. But see Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural
Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L. REV. 869, 916 (2010) (noting that, at
the federal level, the political process has successfully safeguarded the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction; although there have been times when “Congress has successfully
displaced the inferior federal courts,” it has nevertheless “proven far more difficult for
Congress to curb the Supreme Court's appellate review power”). While these structural
safeguards have protected the Supreme Court’s supervisory appellate power, they do not
protect the error-correction function of the intermediate federal courts or of state courts.
330. See Megan Annitto, Juvenile Justice on Appeal, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 671, 672
(2012) (“Although the discretion of judges in juvenile delinquency cases is not
‘unreviewable,’ in practical terms, juvenile delinquency cases are rarely subject to
appellate review.”).
331. Id. at 716.
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participants have “an awareness of the importance of appeals.”332 In
Florida, the state with the highest appeal rate, one juvenile public
defender emphasized the role of appeals in guaranteeing basic rights:
she stated, “If someone came to me and wanted to build a model
office to represent juveniles, I would say to them, if you have ten
dollars, put nine of them into having a good system of appellate
review.”333 When appellate protections are offered in juvenile cases,
they have offered significant protection.334 Appellate review has
proved especially important in guarding against wrongful convictions
due to false confession, as the risk of such false confessions is much
higher with minors than with adults and increases as the age of the
accused offender decreases.335
It is interesting that appellate review is so rarely used in juvenile
cases, even in states that otherwise provide robust appellate remedies,
and even when juveniles have a de jure right to appeal their
adjudications. Given the different appeal rates across states, it does
not appear that appeals are simply unneeded or unwanted in juvenile
cases; instead, it appears to be more a function of the legal culture and
awareness of appellate protections.336 In this regard, the expressive
power of a constitutional rule may outweigh a statutory right; the very
act of constitutionalization may heighten the role of appellate
remedies within the larger legal culture.337 As Professor Leubsdorf
has written, constitutional law can “improve civil procedure by
focusing legislative attention on dark spots and neglected values and
by forcing the system to respond to an individual’s claim of
injustice.”338 Even if the impact of this change were limited to
marginalized groups or outlier cases, the overall increase in justice
would be consistent with the goals of due process.339
332. Id. at 716–17.
333. Id. at 730.
334. See id. at 717.
335. See id. at 732 (“A study of falsely convicted youth found that 31% of exonerated
youth that were previously convicted had falsely confessed to the crime, mostly due to
police inducement. The number increased to nearly half when isolating younger juveniles
ages eleven to fourteen.”).
336. See id. at 717.
337. For an empirical analysis of the expressive function of law, see Patricia Funk, Is
There an Expressive Function of Law? An Empirical Analysis of Voting Laws with
Symbolic Fines, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 135, 156 (2007) (concluding that “governmental
actions which appeal to the civic duty (i.e. by legally prescribing it) may have substantial
effects,” whereas “actions which target at reducing the costs of provision of the public
good might be less effective in certain situations”).
338. Leubsdorf, supra note 12, at 615.
339. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 887 (2009)
(“[E]xtreme cases are more likely to cross constitutional limits, requiring this Court’s
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In order to tap the expressive power of constitutional
recognition, however, the effect of that power must be distributed
throughout the legal culture. Recognizing the need for marginalized
groups to obtain justice is a substantive end that is susceptible to
being excluded by the political process.340 Constitutional recognition
of the process values underlying appellate rights, by contrast, is less
susceptible to encroachment; generalized process values are better
able to shape the larger legal culture than are more politically
controversial substantive ends.341 The most effective way to protect
the substantive rights of marginalized groups may therefore be to
enshrine procedural rights of appeal for all.342
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should explicitly recognize a due process
right of appeal in both civil and criminal cases. Appeals play a
number of important roles in the justice system: they allow the
correction of legal and factual errors, encourage the development and
refinement of legal principles, increase uniformity and
standardization in the application of legal rules, and promote respect
for the rule of law. Nearly every U.S. jurisdiction has found that the
benefits of a robust appellate system outweigh the costs, and has
therefore chosen to protect appellate rights though the political
process. Without constitutional protection, however, these rights are
not universally guaranteed—and they are not immune from the
demands of declining state budgets. Recognizing a constitutional right
to appeal would ensure that they are extended to all litigants, even in
times of fiscal stress.
intervention and formulation of objective standards. This is particularly true when due
process is violated.”).
340. See Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299,
1343 (2010) (noting that criminal defendants are a “politically disfavored class of
litigants”).
341. See Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 61, at 81, 155 (acknowledging that
procedural change happens “as a result of political, social, and economic transformations
and reflect emergent social values” and advocating for the elimination of the civil/criminal
distinction, though disputing that all procedural rights should be distributed equally “in the
name of abstract and uncritically accepted notions of fairness and due process”).
342. This conclusion in some ways combines Derrick Bell’s “interest convergence”
theory, which suggests that minority rights would be more likely to obtain recognition
when they converge with majority interests, Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523–24 (1980),
with the notion that procedure in general is necessary to protect substantive rights. See
Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1961, 1981 (2007) (“The primary goal of procedure is to produce outcomes that
enforce the substantive law properly.”).
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Constitutional recognition of a right to appeal would also
comport with modern litigation realities. The Supreme Court’s
criminal and punitive-damages doctrines have already implicitly
recognized a right to appeal, and making that protection explicit
would ensure doctrinal consistency. Moreover, the procedural system
has changed along with substantive doctrine; now, both civil and
criminal procedures have grown in ways that depend on an effective
appellate system. If appellate remedies were removed from the
modern procedural framework, the system as a whole would no
longer provide adequate due process protection. Finally, recognizing
constitutional protection for appellate rights would also express a
normative view, promoting the values of institutional legitimacy,
respect for individual dignity, predictability, and accuracy. Appellate
procedure has earned a place in our contemporary understanding of
due process; it is time to recognize its role as a fundamental guarantee
of fair judicial practice.
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